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Modern international carriage of goods by sea is largely regulated by various international 
conventions. Such regimes include the Hague Rules, the Hague-Visby Rules and the 
Hamburg Rules. We may also look to national and regional hybrid regimes that incorporate 
various elements of these international conventions. These international conventions, 
however, have significant shortcomings and are considered outdated in modern times.  
The Hague Rules, although widely accepted, were drafted over ninety years ago, and the 
Visby amendments only made slight changes. They do not cater for modern trade practises 
such as containerisation (which allows for multimodal transportation) and door-to-door 
transport. The Hague and Hague-Visby Rules are considered outdated in this regard as they 
only apply to sea carriage (‘tackle-to-tackle’). Due to developments in technology and 
communications, it is also argued that there is no reason why the carrier should only be 
required to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy before and at the beginning 
of the voyage, and not throughout the entire sea voyage. Furthermore, in the modern shipping 
environment it is questionable why the carrier should still benefit from the nautical fault 
defence, a contentious defence that exonerates the carrier from liability due to the faults of its 
employees in the navigation or management of the ship.  
The Hamburg Rules were an attempt to address the shortcomings of its predecessors, for 
example, it removed the nautical fault defence from the list of exceptions available to the 
carrier and extended its scope of application to ‘port-to-port’. However, the Hamburg Rules 
did not achieve widespread success and have not been ratified by major maritime trading 
nations. 
The result of such a multiplicity of rules on the international carriage of goods by sea is that 
uniformity is undermined, creating legal uncertainty. These challenges are further heightened 
by the fact that the current sea conventions in force have significant shortcomings, which will 
be further discussed in this study. The international maritime community responded to these 
shortcomings by adopting the Rotterdam Rules in 2008. These Rules are intended to serve as 
a uniform and modern legal regime setting out the rights and obligations of the shipper, 
carrier and consignee.  
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In attempting to achieve their goals of uniformity and modernity, the Rules have introduced 
significant changes. The three major changes introduced by the Rotterdam Rules, and which 
form the basis of this study, are the provision for multimodal transportation, the extension of 
the carrier’s seaworthiness obligation and the removal of the nautical fault defence. 
Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to critically analyse the three major changes 
introduced by the Rotterdam Rules and to determine the extent to which they have provided 
appropriate solutions to the alleged shortcomings of its predecessors, the Hague-Visby Rules 
and the Hamburg Rules. 
This study engages in a comparative analysis of the Rotterdam Rules with the Hague-Visby 
Rules and the Hamburg Rules in relation to the above three major changes. It will be a 
literature based study (desk-top research) and will analyse relevant international conventions, 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Brief overview of the topic  
The international carriage of goods by sea plays a significant role in terms of global trade and 
economic growth,
1
 with over 90 percent of global trade carried by sea.
2
 Without ships and the 
transportation services they provide, the import and export of goods required for today’s 
modern world would not be possible.
3
 Given the importance of and complexities involved in 
the carriage of goods by sea, it therefore requires regulation by a uniform and efficient set of 
rules that reflect the needs of the key parties involved in a carriage contract.
4
  
Today’s international carriage of goods by sea is largely regulated by various international 
regimes. Such regimes include the Hague Rules,
5
 the Hague-Visby Rules,
6
 and the Hamburg 
Rules.
7
 We may also look to national and regional hybrid regimes that incorporate various 
elements of these international conventions.
8
 With such a multiplicity of rules governing the 
international carriage of goods by sea, it invariably leads to fragmentation of the rules 
governing sea carriage laws and creates legal uncertainty, thereby frustrating uniformity and 
predictability.
9
 Furthermore, the abovementioned conventions have significant shortcomings. 
The Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, although widely accepted, are considered outdated in the 
modern shipping environment and it is argued that they are biased in favour of the carrier. 
One of the main obligations of the carrier/ship-owner is that of exercising due diligence to 
                                                             
1 International Maritime Organisation (IMO) available at https://business.un.org/en/entities/13 accessed on 22 
September 2015 
2 ‘International shipping facts and figures – Information resources on trade, safety, security, environment’ 
available at 
http://www.imo.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/ShipsAndShippingFactsAndFigures/TheRoleandImportanceofInterna
tionalShipping/Documents/International%20Shipping%20-%20Facts%20and%20Figures.pdf, accessed on 25 
August 2015 
3 ‘The economic role of the shipping industry’ (15 September 2012) available at 
https://ramiwaheed.wordpress.com/2012/09/15/the-economic-role-of-the-shipping-industry/, accessed on 25 
August 2015 
4 D N Metuge Carriage of goods by sea – from Hague to Rotterdam: Safer waters (unpublished LLM thesis, 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, 2012) iv 
5 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading (Hague Rules), Hague, 
August 25 1924, 120 U.N.T.S. 156 
6 Protocol Amending the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of 
Lading (Hague-Visby Rules), Brussels, February 23 1968 
7
 United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by sea (Hamburg Rules), Hamburg, March 31 1978, 1695 
U.N.T.S. 3 
8
 T Nikaki ‘The carrier’s duties under the Rotterdam Rules: Better the devil you know?’ (2010) 35 (1) Tulane 
Maritime Law Journal 1 
9 Ibid 2 
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provide a seaworthy vessel. However, in an attempt to more equitably balance the rights 
between carrier and shipper, under Article III of Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, the carrier is 
only required to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy before and at the 
beginning of the voyage. Therefore, the carrier is under no obligation to maintain the vessels 
seaworthiness throughout the sea voyage. Furthermore, the Rules contain a list of exceptions 
that the carrier may rely on to escape liability, including the contentious nautical fault 
defence that exonerates the carrier from liability due to the faults of its employees (under 
appropriate circumstances).
10
 The Rules also only apply in respect of sea carriage and do not 
cater for carriage that involves multiple modes of transport. The Hamburg Rules were an 
attempt to resolve the shortcomings of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules and to balance the 
interests between carrier and shipper, however, they did not achieve widespread acceptance 
and are perceived as unduly favouring shipper interests.  
Given the shortcomings with the abovementioned conventions and the fact that there is a lack 
of uniformity on the rules governing the international carriage of goods by sea, it is clear that 
there is a need for a single regime that will provide a uniform set of rules to modernise and 
harmonise the international carriage of goods by sea.
11
 As a result, the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea was 
adopted in 2008 (the Rotterdam Rules) and will come into force one year from the date of 
ratification, accession, approval or acceptance by the 20
th
 UN member state.
12
   
The Rotterdam Rules are the latest attempt to provide a uniform and modern set of rules 
governing the international carriage of goods involving a sea leg that will regulate the rights 
and obligations of the carrier, shipper and consignee.
13
 In this regard, they have introduced a 
number of significant changes, taking into account the technological and commercial 
developments in the shipping industry.
14
 The three major changes introduced by the Rules, 
and which form the basis of this study, are the provision for multimodal transportation, the 
                                                             
10 Article IV (2) (a) of the Hague-Visby Rules 
11 Nikaki op cit note 8 at 3 
12 The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea 
(Rotterdam Rules), Rotterdam, December 11 2008, UN Doc. A/RES/63/122; Article 94 of the Rotterdam Rules 
13
 UNCITRAL introductory note  on the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage 
of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea (New York, 2008)(the “Rotterdam Rules”) available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods/2008rotterdam_rules.html accessed on 




extension of the carrier’s seaworthiness obligation and the removal of the nautical fault 
defence.  
Despite these developments, however, it has been suggested that the Rotterdam Rules are 
overly complicated and do not necessarily achieve their intended aims of uniformity, 
modernity and efficiency in international trade or provide appropriate solutions to the 
shortcomings of the Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules.
15
 With regard to the provision for 
multimodal transportation under the Rotterdam Rules, it has been suggested that its 
provisions are overly complex and it is not a truly multimodal regime, which many had hoped 
for. With regard to the carrier’s seaworthiness obligation, it has been suggested that the basis 
of liability of the carrier and burden of proof under Article 17, which is inextricably linked to 
the carrier’s seaworthiness obligation, is overly complex. Furthermore, it will need to be 
determined whether carriers would be able to comply with an extended seaworthiness 
obligation in practice. With regard to the deletion of the nautical fault defence, although there 
has been a call for its removal in recent years, it will need to be determined whether its 
removal is an appropriate solution in light of both carrier and shipper interests, and whether 
from a practical perspective it is an appropriate solution.  
1.2 Rationale and purpose of the study 
The Rotterdam Rules have become the subject of great academic debate and are highly 
topical at present, and rightfully so. The decision to replace a well-entrenched and long-
standing regime, the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, which, for the most part is adequate, 
requires an in depth understanding of its provisions. If states are to adopt an entirely new 
regime, it needs to be beneficial to both carriers and shippers and improve on previous 
regimes and facilitate ease of international trade.  From a South Africa perspective, the study 
is also relevant. The South African government has launched Operation Phakisa,
16
 an 
initiative intended to implement its policies and programmes faster and more effectively. 
With aspects of the operation focusing on the economic potential of South Africa’s oceans, it 
                                                             
15 For example, see J Alcantara … et al ‘Particular concerns with regard to the Rotterdam Rules’ April 2010, 
available at http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Rotterdam%20Rules/Particular%20concerns%20-
%20Rotterdam%20Rules.pdf accessed 22 September 2015 
16
 Operation Phakisa available at  http://www.operationphakisa.gov.za/Pages/Home.aspx - Operation Phakisa 
– Marine Protection Services and Governance Final Lab Report. (2014). Unlocking the Economic Potential of 
South Africa’s Oceans. Available at 
file:///C:/Users/Image/Downloads/OPOceans%20MPSG%20Final%20Lab%20Report%20OPT.pdf  accessed 16 
December 2016, pg 72) 
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has identified the need to monitor and keep up to date with developments regarding the 
carriage of goods. It is possibly looking at replacing the South African Carriage of Goods by 
Sea Act 1 of 1986 (SA COGSA, which gives effect to the Hague-Visby Rules) with the 
Rotterdam Rules, should they be widely accepted (Please see footnote 16 for more 
information on Operation Phakisa and the suggested updating of the SA COGSA)  
An in depth analysis of the Rotterdam Rules in its entirety is beyond the scope of this study, 
especially all 96 articles, therefore this study will focus solely on the abovementioned three 
major and potentially controversial changes introduced by the Rules. 
Accordingly, it will be appropriate to engage in a comparative analysis between the Hague-
Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules and the Rotterdam Rules with regard to multimodal 
transportation, the carrier’s seaworthiness obligation and the nautical fault defence to 
determine the extent to which the Rotterdam Rules have provided appropriate solutions to the 
shortcomings of its predecessors.  
1.3 Research question and issues to be investigated 
In answering the research question as to whether the three major changes introduced by the 
Rotterdam Rules are an appropriate solution to the shortcomings of its predecessors, this 
dissertation will critically analyse the concepts relating to multimodal transportation, the 
carrier’s seaworthiness obligation and the nautical fault defence, thereby engaging in a 
comparative analysis between the Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules and the Rotterdam 
Rules with regard to the abovementioned changes. It will examine the positive and negative 
features of each regime in order to determine the extent to which the changes in the 
Rotterdam Rules are appropriate solutions to the shortcomings of its predecessors. To achieve 
this objective, this study will examine the relevant provisions under each regime with regard 
to multimodalism, the seaworthiness obligation and the nautical fault defence. Relevant 
primary and secondary sources will also be utilised.  
1.4 Breakdown of chapters 
This dissertation is structured as follows: 
Chapter one provides a brief overview of the topic, the purpose, an outline of the main 
research question and an overview of the chapters of this study.   
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Chapter two explores the historical background and development of the various carriage of 
goods by sea regimes leading up to the adoption of the Rotterdam Rules in 2008.   
Chapter three examines the multimodal aspects of the Rotterdam Rules and engages in a 
comparative analysis of its relevant provisions with those of the Hague-Visby Rules and 
Hamburg Rules. It will determine the extent to which the Rotterdam Rules have provided 
appropriate solutions to the shortcomings of its predecessors with regard to multimodal 
transportation. The issue will also be addressed briefly from a South African perspective. 
Chapter four examines the carrier’s seaworthiness obligation and engages in a comparative 
analysis of the relevant provisions of the Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules and the 
Rotterdam Rules in this regard. It will determine the extent to which the extension of the 
carrier’s seaworthiness obligation under the Rotterdam Rules is an appropriate solution to the 
shortcomings of its predecessors. 
Chapter five examines the nautical fault defence and engages in a comparative analysis 
between the relevant provisions of the Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules and the 
Rotterdam Rules in this regard. It will examine arguments both in favour of and against the 
removal of the nautical defence in order to determine the extent to which its removal from the 
Rotterdam Rules and Hamburg Rules is an appropriate solution to the shortcomings of the 
Hague-Visby Rules.  
Chapter six provides a summary of the findings and provides a final conclusion and 










CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The history and development of the rules governing the carriage of goods by sea is an 
important one and will assist in determining the reason for a new international Convention on 
the carriage of goods by sea.  
2.1 Roman Law 
The starting point of this study can be traced back to early Roman law where owners of cargo 
(also referred to as shippers) had the onerous task of proving fault on the part of the carrier 
(either the owner or charterer of the vessel) in order to succeed in a claim for loss or damage 
to their goods.
17
 This burden was lifted slightly with the enactment of the Praetor’s edict, an 
order or rule made by the Praetor (a Magistrate), which imposed certain liabilities on 
shipmasters, innkeepers and stable keepers, thereby tilting the rules in favour of the cargo 
owner.
18
 The Praetor did not trust ocean carriers and suspected that they engaged with thieves 
to arrange for the disappearance of the cargo in their care.
19
 The Praetor therefore imposed an 
obligation on the carrier to restore the cargo entrusted to it in good condition, failing which 
the carrier would be held strictly liable.
20
 The increasing strict liability of the carrier, with 
few exceptions to rely on, became a part of most sea carriage liability regimes, and was 
received into English law.
21
  
2.2 English Law 
The early 19
th
 century saw shippers protected to a great extent under both common and civil 
law jurisdictions.
22
 Carriers were held strictly liable for cargo loss or damage with few 
exceptions to rely on.
23
 It entailed a duty on the carrier to deliver the goods at the place of 
destination in the same condition in which it received the goods, and a failure to do so would 
                                                             
17 J Hare Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa 2 ed (2009) 618; The cargo-owner would have 
to prove the fault of the carrier during a time in shipping where no record was kept, placing an almost 
impossible task on the cargo-owner to prove the liability of the carrier 
18 Hare op cit note 17 at 618 
19
 A Govindjee …et al Fresh Perspectives: Commercial Law 2 (2007) 277 
20
 Ibid 277 
21
 Hare op cit note 17 at 619-620 
22
 J A Estrella-Faria ‘Uniform law for international transport at UNCITRAL: New times, new players, and new 
rules’ (2009) 44 (3) Texas International Law Journal 280 
23 Hare op cit note 17 at 619 
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result in its liability.
24
 Unless the carrier was able to show that its negligence was not the 
cause of the loss or damage and that it was due to one of the following exceptions: “an act of 
God; an act of public enemies; shipper’s fault; or inherent vice of the goods”, the carrier 
would be held strictly liable for the loss of or damage to the cargo.
25
 This was based on the 
principle that whoever is in possession of the cargo and is able to exercise control over it 
should ultimately bear legal responsibility and ensure its welfare.
26
  
The seemingly burdensome strict liability of the carrier, however, did not place it at the 
mercy of the shipper.
27
  On the contrary, carriers were entitled to contract out of liability 
almost entirely through the inclusion of exoneration clauses into their bills of lading.
28
 The 
development of steam power allowed for the growth of shipping companies in terms of size 
and economic strength.
29
 The absence of competition in sea transport also put carriers at an 
advantage, allowing them to fix their own terms for the carriage of goods.
30
 And in British 
jurisdictions (with England operating the world’s largest fleet at the time),
31
 the courts would 
uphold freedom of contract, seeing their role as one of ensuring that parties upheld the terms 
of their agreement.
32
 As a result, the carrier remained the dominant contracting party until the 





Cargo-owning nations and consignees were dissatisfied.
34
 This was especially the case in the 
United States of America where courts began finding clauses in bills of lading that sought to 
reduce or exclude the carrier’s liability to be against public policy and therefore not valid.
35
 
They took the view that carriers could not exonerate themselves from liability for damage or 
loss of cargo as a result of their own negligence or failure to provide a seaworthy vessel.
36
 
This growing aversion toward the British monopoly over international transport and the 
                                                             
24 J Adamsson The Rotterdam Rules A transport convention for the future? (unpublished LLM thesis, Lund 
University, 2011) 9 
25 Ibid 9 
26 Y Yang The abolition of the nautical fault exemption: To be or not to be (unpublished LLM thesis, Lund 
University, 2011) 4 
27 S Zamora ‘Carrier liability for damage or loss to cargo in international transport’ (1975) 23 (3) American 
Journal of Comparative Law 400 
28 Hare op cit note 17 at 621; Yang op cit note 26 at 10 
29 Zamora op cit note 27 at 400 
30 Ibid 400 
31
 Yang op cit note 26 at 11 
32
 I Carr, P Stone International Trade Law 5 ed (2014) 217  
33
 Hare op cit note 17 at 622 
34
 Ibid 622 
35
 Yang op cit note 26 at 11 
36 Ibid 11 
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carrier’s exploitation of its dominant position eventually lead to the passing of the 1893 
Harter Act in the United States of America.
37
  
2.3 The Harter Act 
The Harter Act, so named after Congressman Michael Harter of Ohio, was an important text, 
representing the first legislative attempt to set the minimum liability of the ocean carrier.
38
 
Although its main purpose was to thwart the carrier’s attempts to contract out of liability,
39
 it 
also sought a compromise between carrier and shipper interests.
40
 It introduced the concept of 
due diligence as the minimum standard of seaworthiness to which the carrier could not 
contract out of.
41
 In other words, the carrier now had the obligation to exercise due diligence 
to make the vessel seaworthy, and could not contract out of this obligation. Furthermore, any 
bill of lading that sought to absolve the carrier from liability for negligence in the “proper 
loading, stowage, custody, care or proper delivery of the goods” would be void.
42
 As a quid 
pro quo,
43
 a list of exceptions was added, which the carrier could rely on to escape liability, 
including damage or loss caused from the faults and errors in the navigation or management 
of the vessel.
44
 As a result, the Harter Act is considered a significant milestone in the 
development of the rules governing the carriage of goods by sea with many of its features still 
present in national and international regimes today.
45
  
Many countries representing cargo interests followed the United States’ lead and enacted 
legislation similar to the Harter Act, such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada.
46
 However, 
this legislation was only applicable in respect of domestic and outbound bills of lading, 
meaning that importers in those countries would not benefit from their own law.
47
 From an 
international perspective, there was also a lack of uniformity on the rules governing the 
carriage of goods by sea.
48
 The use of different forms of bills of lading by different 
                                                             
37 Hare op cit note 17 at 622-623; Zamora op cit note 27 at 402 
38 Ibid 402 
39 Hare op cit note 17 at 623 
40 Estrella-Faria op cit note 22 at 283 
41 Hare op cit note 17 at 623 
42 Estrella-Faria op cit note 22 at 282 
43 ‘Quid pro quo’ is a Latin phrase meaning ‘something for something’. It is a favour or advantage granted in 
return for something else.  
44
 Hare op cit note 17 at 623 
45
 Ibid 623 
46
 M Sturley ‘The History of COGSA and the Hague Rules’ 1991 (22) 1 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 8 
47
 Ibid 8 
48 Adamsson op cit note 24 at 11 
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jurisdictions further complicated the issue of non-uniformity.
49
 Many ship-owning nations 
still continued to uphold freedom of contract, allowing carriers to set their own liability 
terms.
50
 The result was that the Harter Act had not achieved the uniformity in carrier liability 
as hoped, and it was evident that uniformity in carrier liability and harmonious global trade 
could only be achieved at an international level.
51
   
2.4 The Hague Rules 
With a clear need for uniformity in international trade, an initiative was taken up in 1921 by 
the Maritime Law Committee of the International Law Association.
52
 With the aim of 
adopting a bill of lading that would be uniform, simple, reasonable and suitable for use in 
international trade, a code of Rules was drafted and presented at a conference by the 
Maritime Law Committee held at the Hague in September 1921.
53
 However, these Rules 
were not binding on any nations and had to be inserted voluntarily by carriers into bills of 
lading, which they largely ignored.
54
 As a result, a decision was taken to transform the Rules 
from ‘model Rules’ into a draft international Convention.
55
 Finally, the Rules were adopted 
and thereby giving it the status of international Convention in 1924 in Brussels at a 
conference attended by twenty-six nations, and later entered into force in 1931.
56
 These Rules 
are known as the Hague Rules and have been widely accepted with the majority of nations 
becoming signatories to the Rules.
57
 The Rules are based on provisions found in the Harter 
Act and set a minimum standard of liability that carriers cannot contract out of.
58
 They 
represent a compromise between the interests of the shipper and the carrier, balancing the 
risks to be borne by each party.
59
 Under the Hague Rules the carrier is bound before and at 
the beginning of the voyage to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy and to 
                                                             
49 F Reynolds ‘The Hague Rules, the Hague-Visby Rules, and the Hamburg Rules’ (1990) 7 Australian and New 
Zealand Maritime Law Journal 18 
50 Zamora op cit note 27 at 404 
51 Ibid 402 
52 Hare op cit note 17 at 624 
53 C R Dunlop ‘The Hague Rules, 1921’ (1922) 4 (Parts 1 and 4) Journal of Comparative and International Law 27 
54 Yang op cit note 26 at 14 
55
 Ibid 14 
56
 Adamsson op cit note 24 at 12; Yang op cit note 26 at 14 
57
 P Myburgh ‘Uniformity or unilateralism in the law of carriage of goods by sea?’ (2000) 31 (2) Victoria 
University of Wellington Law Review 361 
58
 I Carr, P Stone op cit note 32 at 218 
59 Yang op cit note 26 at 15 
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properly load, stow, carry, care for, and discharge the goods carried.
60
 This is a minimum 
standard of liability and any provision in the bill of lading that attempts to limit these duties is 
void.
61
 Acknowledging that ocean transport is particularly risky,
62
 the Rules afford the carrier 
protection through a list of exceptions that it may rely on to escape liability where 
appropriate. This includes the nautical fault exception, a contentious defence allowing the 
carrier to escape liability for the faults of its servants in the navigation or management of the 
vessel.
63
 However, the seaworthiness obligation is considered to be an overriding obligation, 
meaning that before the carrier may seek to rely on one of the exceptions, it must first prove 




The Hague Rules were the first set of international Rules that successfully unified the law 
governing the carriage of goods by sea and established a mandatory set of Rules, outlining 
the rights and obligations of both the carrier and shipper.
65
 As a result of its success, the 
Rules have been widely accepted and have remained the dominant carriage regime for a 
number of years.
66
   
2.5 The Hague-Visby Rules 
Despite its success and widespread acceptance, certain defects were noted under the Hague 
Rules.
67
 This included, amongst other issues, problems with the package or unit limitation, 
the introduction of the container,
68
 and the fact that the Rules could be excluded through the 
inclusion of a choice of law clause opting for the law of a jurisdiction which had not adopted 
the Rules.
69
 As a result, in 1959 the Comite Maritime International (CMI) commenced work 
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on amendments to the Rules.
70
 The result was a draft protocol which was approved by the 
CMI at a conference in 1963 and signed at Visby.
71
  The draft Rules were subsequently 
amended and formally adopted at a Diplomatic Conference held in Brussels in 1968.
72
 This 
Visby protocol amending the Hague Rules is known as the Hague-Visby Rules.
73
 The Hague-
Visby Rules entered into force in 1977 once it received the requisite number of ratifications.
74
 
Together, the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules have been widely accepted with the majority of 
maritime nations in the world being signatories to either of the Rules.
75
  
It is interesting to note that the Hague-Visby Rules preserved the provisions regulating the 
carrier’s liability, including the list of exceptions.
76
 The Hague-Visby Rules, like the Harter 
Act, serve as a compromise between carrier and cargo-interests.
77
 It allocates risks between 
parties and these risks are then insured. Article 3 of the Rules sets out the obligations of the 
carrier, which includes a duty to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy before 
and at the beginning of the voyage. Article III rule 1 states as follows: 
“The carrier shall be bound before and at the beginning of the voyage to exercise due 
diligence to:  
(a)  Make the ship seaworthy;  
(b) Properly man, equip and supply the ship;  
(c) Make the holds, refrigeration and cool chambers, and all other parts of the ship in which 
goods are carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation.” 
This definition of seaworthiness is a departure from the absolute obligation under the 
common law to provide a seaworthy vessel.
78
 Article IV rule 2 also provides a set of 
exceptions that the carrier may rely on to avoid liability. This also includes the contentious 
nautical fault defence under Rule 2 (a) which states as follows: 
2. “Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or 
resulting from: 
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(a) Act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot, or the servants of the 
carrier in the navigation or in the management of the ship.”
79
 
As stated, these rules in either form have been widely accepted and served as an acceptable 
compromise between carrier and cargo interests for a long period of time. South Africa has 
even given effect to the Hague-Visby Rules in its domestic Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 
(SA COGSA).
80
 However, the Hague Rules are over 90 years old, and the Visby amendments 
only made slight changes. Their roots lie in the Harter Act, drafted over a 100 years ago.  
Many developing states representing shipper and cargo interests that were not involved in the 
drafting of the Hague Rules started participating in international trade.
81
 They perceived the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules as favouring the ship-owning developed nations that dominated 
maritime trade.
82
 Accordingly, the Rules are considered outdated and are not without their 
concerns, particularly with regard to the carrier’s seaworthiness obligation, the nautical fault 
defence, and the fact that the Rules do not cater for multimodal transportation. The obligation 
to provide a seaworthy vessel only before and at the beginning of the voyage was suitable for 
its time due to restrictions in communications and technologies.
83
 However, this is no longer 
the case.  Due to advancements in technology and communication in the shipping industry, it 
is argued that there is no reason why the carrier should not be expected to exercise due 
diligence to make and keep the vessel seaworthy throughout the entire sea voyage.
84
 Ship-
owners are in constant contact with their vessels and staff, and repairs can be effected at the 
nearest port.
85
 Furthermore, the nautical fault defence is considered to be an outdated 
exception dating back to when maritime ventures were perilous
86
 and carriers were not able 
to make contact with their masters and crew once at sea.
87
 It is questionable why the carrier 
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should benefit from this exception in light of modern technologies and developments,
88
 and 
the fact that this exception is not available to carriers of other modes of transport.
89
 As 
mentioned, the Rules also do not cater for modern trade practises such as containerisation 
(which allows for goods to be carried by multiple modes of transport) and door-to-door 
transport.
90
 Accordingly, one of the major criticisms levelled against the Hague-Visby Rules 
is that they do not cater for multimodal transportation and are a ‘tackle-to-tackle’ regime.
91
 
Since transportation today is often multimodal due to an increase in the use of containers, a 
carriage regime capable of adequately regulating such transport is required.
 92
  
Due to the abovementioned shortcomings, the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules are considered 
outdated, inefficient, and biased in favour of carrier interests.
93
  
2.6 The Hamburg Rules 
The defects of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules led to work on the formulation of a new ocean 
carriage regime by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 
1968.
94
 However, this project was handed over to the newly formed United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).
95
 UNCITRAL spent five years 
working on a draft carriage regime which was subsequently accepted in 1976.
96
 After further 
negotiations, a Diplomatic Conference was held in Hamburg, Germany in 1978 in which the 
final text of the new carriage regime was approved, and these Rules are commonly referred to 
as the Hamburg Rules.
97
 
The Hamburg Rules were an attempt to address the shortcomings of its predecessors. 
However, the Hamburg Rules did not achieve widespread success and, unlike its 
predecessors, had the opposite effect of favouring cargo-interests.
98
 The Rules introduce a 
presumed-fault based system of liability, meaning that the carrier is liable for loss of or 
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damage to the goods if the event which caused the loss or damage took place whilst the goods 
were in its charge, unless it can prove that it, its servants or agents took all measures that 
could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences.
99
 In other words, 
the carrier is presumed to be at fault for any loss or damage, unless it can prove otherwise. 
The wording and construction of the Hamburg Rules differs substantially from the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, with many notable differences. For example, the seaworthiness 
obligation and the list of defences under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules do not feature in the 
text of the Hamburg Rules, including the nautical fault defence.  It was argued by carriers that 
because the Hamburg Rules tend to favour cargo-interests, the potential for carrier liability 
increases. This perceived increase in carrier liability would therefore impact freight rates, 
insurance costs, and see an increase in litigation over the interpretation of its provisions.
100
 It 
is argued that the increase in carrier liability and the removal of carrier-friendly elements, 
such as the nautical fault defence, are some of the reasons major maritime trading nations 
have not ratified the Hamburg Rules.
101
 The Rules also only apply from the period when the 
carrier takes the goods in its charge at the port of loading and subsequently ends at the port of 
discharge (port-to-port),
102
  and does not cover a door-to-door contract.
103
 The Hague-Visby 
Rules and Hamburg Rules are thus both lacking in this regard. Due to its poor reception and 
acceptance, the Hamburg Rules have had very little impact and influence on international 
trade and maritime transport.
104
 
2.7 The Rotterdam Rules 
The above discussed conventions are applied by various nations, many of which have 
implemented the convention that they are party to into their domestic legislation, sometimes 
even implementing a hybrid of the various conventions into their domestic legislation.
105
 The 
application of different carriage regimes by different nations, including the application of 
domestic laws reflecting a hybrid of different regimes, creates a lack of uniformity and 
increases legal uncertainty.
106
 This risk of legal uncertainty, coupled with the other significant 
shortcomings of the existing carriage regimes, clearly indicates that there is a need for a 
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convention that adequately caters for modern trade and transport practises; balancing the 
varied commercial interests of all parties involved and creating uniformity in the application 
of international rules governing the carriage of goods by sea.
107
  
As a response to the above predicament, two international bodies, the CMI and UNCITRAL, 
joined forces in an attempt to promote greater international uniformity and to modernise the 
rules governing the carriage of goods by sea
108
 The CMI appointed an International Working 
Group which prepared the first drafts of a new Convention.
109
 This project was handed over 
to Working Group III convened by UNCITRAL in 2001 and remained closely involved with 
UNCITRAL in the preparation of the final draft Convention.
110
 The draft regime was 
presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) for review and comment, and 
on the 11
th
 December 2008 during its 63
rd
 session, the UN General Assembly passed a 
resolution in which it adopted the Rules as the ‘United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea’.
111
 It authorised an official 
signing ceremony for the Convention and recommended that the Rules be known as the 
‘Rotterdam Rules’, which took place on 23 September 2009 in Rotterdam.
112
 The Rules will 
come into force one year from the date of ratification, accession, approval or acceptance by 
the 20
th
 UN member state.
113
 To date, only Spain, Togo and Congo have ratified the 
Rotterdam Rules.
114
 Although the Rules have not yet received the requisite number of 
ratifications to enter into force, it is hoped that they will replace the current international 
conventions, specifically the Hague Rules, the Hague-Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules, 
in order to achieve uniformity and certainty in the application of the laws regulating the 
carriage of goods by sea.
115
   
The Rules are intended to serve as a uniform and modern legal regime setting out the rights 
and obligations of the shipper, carrier and consignee.
116
 In an attempt to achieve these goals 
of uniformity and modernity, the Rules have introduced significant changes. The three major 
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changes introduced by the Rotterdam Rules, and which form the basis of this study, are the 
provision for multimodal transportation, the extension of the carrier’s seaworthiness 
obligation and the removal of the nautical fault defence.  
With regard to the provision for multimodal transportation, Article 1 of the Rules states as 
follows:  
1. “‘Contract of carriage’ means a contract in which a carrier, against the payment of freight, 
undertakes to carry goods from one place to another. The contract shall provide for 




The above definition indicates that the Rules not only cover sea carriage but also carriage by 
other modes of transport, as long as there is an international sea leg.
118
 Article 12 of the Rules 
sets out the period of responsibility of the carrier as follows: 
1. “The period of responsibility of the carrier for the goods under this Convention begins 
when the carrier or a performing party receives the goods for carriage and ends when the 
goods are delivered.” 
The period of responsibility of the carrier has been extended from the time when the carrier 
receives the goods for carriage until the moment the goods are delivered, therefore, the Rules 
may apply to a situation where the carrier undertakes to take charge of the goods at the door 
of the shipper and to deliver them at the door of the consignee i.e. door-to-door.
119
 The 
extension of the period of responsibility and provision for multimodal carriage contracts is a 
significant development, going beyond the Hague-Visby Rules which only apply ‘tackle-to-
tackle’, and the Hamburg Rules, which apply ‘Port-to-Port’. As stated, transportation today is 
often multimodal due to developments in containerisation, thus, it is necessary for the law to 
be updated and to regulate these developments.
120
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With regard to the carrier’s seaworthiness duty, the Rotterdam Rules have kept this duty 
under Article 14 with similar wording to the Hague-Visby Rules. However, they extend the 
carriers obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel throughout the entire sea voyage, and not 
just before and at the beginning of the voyage i.e. a continuous seaworthiness obligation.
121
 
The basis of the carrier’s liability for damage to cargo is set out in Article 17 as well as the 
burden of proof. The Rules also contain a list of exceptions upon which the carrier may rely 
to escape liability. Notably, the Rules have also removed the contentious nautical fault 
defence.  
These are attempts by the Rotterdam Rules to address the shortcomings of its predecessors 
and modernise the Rules governing the international carriage of goods by sea. 
Having traced the development of the various rules governing the carriage of goods by sea, 
the following chapters engage in a comparative analysis between the relevant provisions of 
the Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules and the Rotterdam Rules with regard to 
multimodal transportation, the carrier’s seaworthiness obligation and the nautical fault 
defence in order to the determine whether the Rotterdam Rules have provided appropriate 
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CHAPTER THREE: MULTIMODAL TRANSPORTATION 
3.1 Introduction 
In international trade, goods may be carried by a number of different modes of transport, such 
as ship transport, aviation, and land transport (including road and rail).
122
 Often, and more 
increasingly, goods are carried by a combination of modes of transport, commonly known as 
multimodal transport.
123
 The term ‘multimodal transportation’ is used to describe the 
transportation of goods by a multimodal transport operator (MTO) from one place to another 
by two or more different modes of transport.
124
 The international transportation of goods by 
more than one mode of transport generally only requires “one contract, one transport 
document and one carrier who is responsible from the moment he takes over the goods from 
the shipper till the moment he delivers the goods to the consignee.”
125
 The carrier is generally 
responsible for the entire transport process, even if it sub-contracts part of the carriage.
126
   
The introduction of the container has had a significant impact on the growth of multimodal 
transportation and the efficiency of the international carriage of goods.
127
 Before the 
development of the container, goods would have to be loaded and unloaded from one mode 
of transport to another.
128
 As a result, the goods would have to be handled at various different 
stages before reaching its destination, leading to delay and loss of or damage to the goods.
129
 
The costs involved were also significant as the shipper would be charged separate 
transportation rates and handling costs each time the goods had to be transferred from one 
mode of transport to another.
130
 Furthermore, separate contracts of carriage had to be 
concluded with various carriers in respect of each mode of transport, with each contract 
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subject to varying rules and regulations.
131
 The development of the metal container in the 
1950’s, however, has largely circumvented these issues, offering numerous advantages.
132
 
The container is a large metal box used to hold and carry goods to its destination, which is 
loaded and unloaded by machines.
133
 Through the use of these containers, “labour costs, 
shipping time in port, total transit time, losses due to breakage and theft and cargo-handling 
costs” are significantly reduced.
134
 The carriage of goods by means of a container allows for 
cargo to be easily transferred from one mode of transport to another, such as from train to 
vessel or vehicle to vessel.
135
 This integration of road, rail and sea carriage has allowed for 
the growth of multimodal transportation.
136
  
Traditionally, cargo carried under different modes of transport would require separate 
contracts of carriage, each subject to different legal regimes.
137
 With the development of 
containerisation, cargo increasingly started being carried on a multimodal basis with the use 
of one contract for the entire carriage process.
138
 Under a multimodal contract, the carrier will 
undertake to carry cargo from one place to an ultimate destination with the possibility of 
using multiple modes of transport with the use of one single transport document.
139
 The cargo 
will remain in the container throughout the entire voyage until it reaches its place of 
destination.
140
 Thus, instead of a shipper having to conclude multiple contracts with various 
carriers for each different mode of transport utilised, it is able to conclude one single contract 
of carriage with a single MTO, whilst its cargo remains safe and easily transferrable from one 
mode to the next.
141
 The MTO will undertake responsibility from when it takes the cargo into 
its charge until it delivers the cargo at the door of the consignee. And as mentioned, the MTO 
may sub-contract part or the entire voyage to different persons, whilst still remaining 
ultimately responsible for the carriage of the goods.
142
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The issue that arises, however, is that the multimodal contract is governed by differing legal 
regimes, with each leg of the voyage governed by a different legal regime.
143
 Such regimes 
include, for example: the CMR Convention
144
 which regulates carriage by road in member 
states within the European Union; the Warsaw Convention,
145
 largely amended by the 
Montreal Convention,
146
 which regulates carriage by air; the various versions of the COTIF-
CIM,
147
 which regulates carriage by rail; and the Hague Rules, Hague-Visby Rules and the 
Hamburg Rules that regulates carriage by sea. These regimes each relate to a different mode 
of transport and have been developed separately and independently from each other.
148
 As a 
result, when any of these regimes are applied to a multimodal contract, it will only cover the 
mode of transport it was designed to regulate. Furthermore, and in particular to this study, the 
international carriage of goods by sea regimes are considered outdated and not able to cater 
for the multimodal transportation of goods.
149
 The Hague-Visby Rules only apply ‘tackle-to-
tackle’, whilst the Hamburg Rules apply ‘port-to-port’. The scope of application of these 
carriage regimes is inadequate in a multimodal situation since they are only mandatorily 
applicable for a certain period of the voyage, leaving part of the voyage covered by a 
different regime or subject to different rules.
150
 As a result, there is a lack of uniformity in the 
rules that govern multimodal transport contracts and a need for a single transport regime that 
covers the entire transportation process and extends its application beyond ‘tackle-to-tackle’ 
and ‘port-to-port’.
151
 Furthermore, all attempts thus far to regulate multimodal transport 
through an international regime have been unsuccessful.
152
 These include, for example, the 
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 the Multimodal Convention,
154




The Rotterdam Rules attempt to address the limitations of the current carriage of goods by 
sea regimes in order to better meet the needs of modern trade. These Rules introduce an 
extended scope of application and period of responsibility of the carrier that covers not only 
the carriage of goods by sea, but also the carriage of goods by other modes of transport 
provided that at least one of the legs of carriage is by sea.
156
 This is considered one of the 
most significant changes introduced by these Rules.  However, the extent to which the 
provision for multimodal transport under the Rotterdam Rules is an appropriate solution to its 
predecessors needs to be determined, with concerns that the multimodal aspects of the Rules 
are overly complex and that it is not the multimodal Convention many had hoped for. 
Therefore, the following paragraphs engage in a comparative analysis between the relevant 
provisions of the Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules and the Rotterdam Rules with 
regard to their scope of application and period of responsibility of the carrier. It will engage 
in an analysis of the multimodal aspects of the Rotterdam Rules and thereafter it will seek to 
determine whether the provision for multimodal transport under the Rotterdam Rules 
addresses the shortcomings of its predecessors and if it is an appropriate solution in this 
regard. 
3.2 A comparative analysis between the Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules and the 
Rotterdam Rules with regard to their scope of application and the period of 
responsibility of the carrier 
3.2.1 The Hague-Visby Rules  
The Hague-Visby Rules are limited in terms of its scope of application and do not make 
provision for multimodal carriage.
157
 As per Article 10, the Hague-Visby Rules generally 
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apply only to outbound carriage from a contracting state and apply only to bills of lading.
158
 
Article 1 (e) of the Hague-Visby Rules further states as follows: 
(e) “‘Carriage of goods’ covers the period from the time when the goods are loaded on to the     
time they are discharged from the ship.” 
Their scope of application is ‘tackle-to-tackle’ as the Rules are only compulsorily applicable 
from the moment the cargo is loaded on to the vessel until they are discharged from the 
vessel.
159
 In other words, the Rules only cover ocean carriage. This creates uncertainty as the 
Rules do not cover the situation where the carrier undertakes responsibility and liability for 
the goods before they are loaded on to the vessel and the period after the goods have been 
discharged from the vessel.
160
  The Hague-Visby Rules are not applicable to those non-sea 




The decision to limit the scope of application to ‘tackle-to-tackle’ under the Hague Rules was 
acceptable at that time since that was generally the period of responsibility undertaken by the 
carrier
162
 as goods were received for shipment and delivered to the consignee or its agent 
alongside the vessel (tackle-to-tackle).
163
 Soon, however, the period of responsibility of the 
carrier widened (port-to-port) and the carrier took on greater responsibility by taking charge 
of the goods and delivering them to port warehouses.
164
 Whilst the carrier’s actual 
responsibility had widened, the law had not kept up to date with this development and the 
scope of application of the carrier remained ‘tackle-to-tackle’ under the Hague Rules and was 
not altered by the Hague-Visby Rules.
165
 This was due to the fact that the Hague-Visby Rules 
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were negotiated at a time when multimodal contracts were not prevalent; therefore an 
extension of the application of the Rules was not necessary.
166
  
3.2.2 The Hamburg Rules 
In response to the limited scope of application of the Hague-Visby Rules, the scope of 
application and the period of responsibility of the carrier was widened under the Hamburg 
Rules. Article 4 (1) of the Hamburg Rules sets out the period of responsibility of the carrier 
as follows:  
1. “The responsibility of the carrier for the goods under this Convention covers the period      
during which the carrier is in charge of the goods at the port of loading, during the 
carriage and at the port of discharge.” 
From this definition we see that the Hamburg Rules not only apply ‘tackle-to-tackle’, but also 
‘port-to-port’. In other words, the Rules “cover the entire time the carrier is in charge of the 
goods starting at the port of loading and ending at the port of discharge.”
167
 This addressed 
the limited scope of application of the Hague-Visby Rules by holding the carrier responsible 
for not only the period whilst the goods were on board the vessel, but also during the period 




As we have seen, the Hague-Visby Rules govern the international carriage of goods by sea 
from ‘tackle-to-tackle’, whilst the Hamburg Rules have extended the limited scope of 
application of the Hague-Visby Rules and apply ‘port-to-port’.
169
 However, neither the 
Hague-Visby Rules nor the Hamburg Rules apply to an entire contract of carriage where the 
“carrier undertakes to take the goods in charge at the door of the shipper and to deliver them 
at the door of the consignee”, which has become increasingly popular due to the advent of 
containerised transport.
170
 As a result, the trade industry has felt the need for a convention 
that would regulate the international carriage of goods by different modes of transport.
171
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3.2.3 The Rotterdam Rules 
As noted, the Hague-Visby Rules and Hamburg Rules are inadequate to regulate multimodal 
carriage contracts. All previous attempts at regulating multimodal transport through 
international regimes have also failed. In order to accommodate ‘door-to-door’ carriage, 
therefore, the current practice is for parties to contractually agree to extend the application of 
the relevant sea carriage Convention to the inland leg of the voyage.
172
 However, this is only 
possible if the agreement is not set aside by mandatory national legislation.
173
 Furthermore, 
the sea conventions are maritime in nature and are not intended to cater for anything other 
than sea carriage. The decision to extend the scope of application and period of responsibility 
under the Rotterdam Rules was therefore prompted by the needs of international trade and the 
fact that the majority of containers that are carried by sea are carried ‘door-to-door’.
174
 Even 
if the contract does not go so far as to extend ‘door-to-door’, the carrier’s responsibility will 
invariably cover carriage by some other mode of transport before or after the sea leg.
175
  
The Rotterdam Rules were initially intended to apply on a ‘port-to-port’ basis as provided for 
in the Hamburg Rules, as opposed to the ‘tackle-to-tackle’ approach adopted by the Hague-
Visby Rules.
176
 However, it was thought that restricting the scope of application of the Rules 
to ‘port-to-port’ would not add any value and would simply add another sea carriage 
convention to the existing three conventions, further frustrating uniformity on the rules 
regulating the international carriage of goods by sea.
177
 Therefore, although the Rules were 
originally conceived as a maritime Convention, in order to meet the current needs of trade 
and accommodate multimodal carriage, the Rules were extended to cover more than sea 
carriage alone.
178
 This is evident by observing the full title of the Rotterdam Rules, which 
reads: United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods 
Wholly or Partly by Sea. The Rotterdam Rules not only cover the international carriage of 
goods by sea, but also contemplate carriage partly by sea, thereby allowing for multimodal 
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 The Rotterdam Rules apply to international carriage contracts
180
 provided one of 
the legs is an international sea leg and that “the contractual place of receipt, loading, 
discharge or delivery is located in a Contracting state”.
181
 A contract of carriage is defined 
under Article 1(1) as follows: 
“A contract in which a carrier, against payment of freight, undertakes to carry goods from one 
place to another. The contract shall provide for carriage by sea and may provide for carriage 
by other modes of transport in addition to the sea carriage.” 
The drafters of the Rotterdam Rules adopted a ‘maritime plus’ approach.
182
 The above 
definition highlights the fact that the Rules apply not only to contracts for the carriage of 
goods by sea, but contemplate the carriage of goods involving other modes of transport, such 
as the carriage of goods by truck on land.
183
 However, an international sea leg is an absolute 
requirement in order for the Rules to apply, whilst the use of other modes of transport is not 
(the maritime plus approach).
184
 Accordingly, the Rules were not intended to be a true 
multimodal Convention, but rather a Convention that would regulate contracts of carriage by 
sea and carriage by other modes that precede or follow the sea carriage.
185
 However, there is 
no requirement that the sea leg be the primary mode of transport, neither is it a requirement 
that the other modes be shorter than the sea carriage.
186
 Thus, the Rules will apply in respect 
of any multimodal or unimodal contract that has an international sea leg.
187
 Furthermore, as 
per Article 5, the Rules not only apply to outgoing maritime carriage (as is the case with the 
Hague-Visby Rules), but also apply to incoming maritime carriage.
188
 Thus, it is clear that the 
scope of application of the Rules is substantially wider than the Hague-Visby Rules and the 
Hamburg Rules. Furthermore, the above Articles of the Rotterdam Rules indicate that they 
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are not restricted to carriage covered by a ‘bill of lading or similar document of title’, as is the 
case with the Hague-Visby Rules as per the definition of Contract of Carriage in Article 1 of 
the Hague-Visby Rules. 
In terms of the period of responsibility of the carrier, Article 12 (1) states as follows: 
“The period of responsibility of the carrier for the goods under this Convention begins when 
the carrier or a performing party receives the goods for carriage and ends when the goods are 
delivered.” 
One of the most significant aspects of the Rotterdam Rules is the extension of the period of 
responsibility of the carrier.
189
 The Rules, in contrast to the Hague-Visby Rules and Hamburg 
Rules, adopt a ‘door-to-door’ approach, meaning that the carrier’s period of responsibility 
“could begin and end outside of the port area”, or could be for the entire contractual period.
190
 
For example, the carrier could undertake to receive the goods at an inland location in the 
country of export and deliver them to an inland location in the country of import or the place 
of destination.
191
 It is noteworthy that the period of responsibility is now also in line with the 
scope of application of the Rules, meaning that the same rules will govern the entire period of 
responsibility of the carrier.
192
 This is significant since, in terms of the Hague-Visby Rules, 
the period of responsibility of the carrier and the scope of application differ.
193
 The 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules are only applicable ‘tackle-to-tackle’; however, the period of 
responsibility of the carrier would often in practice begin prior to the goods being loaded onto 
the vessel and extend beyond their unloading off the vessel.
194
 And as noted, the scope of 
application of Hamburg Rules only extends to ‘port-to-port’ carriage.   
It is important to note that although the Rules adopt a ‘door-to-door’ approach, the parties to 
the contract are still free to decide on the carrier’s period of responsibility and they are not 
precluded from agreeing on the traditional ‘tackle-to-tackle’ approach or ‘port-to-port’ 
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 Article 12(3) in this regard allows the parties to agree on the “time and location 
of the receipt and delivery of the goods”.
196
 The only exception to this is in terms of Article 




Thus, having observed the relevant provisions of the Convention, it is clear that the 
Rotterdam Rules have gone significantly further than the Hague-Visby Rules and the 
Hamburg Rules in terms of their scope of application and the period of responsibility of the 
carrier by adopting a ‘door-to-door’ approach, allowing for the application of the Rules to 
multimodal situations. 
To accommodate the carriage of goods by other modes of transport in addition to the carriage 
of goods by sea, the Rotterdam Rules include a number of multimodal related provisions that 
seek to address issues that may arise in a multimodal situation, such as conflicts with other 
unimodal Conventions. The following paragraphs will therefore engage in an examination of 
the multimodal provisions of the Rules.  
3.3 An examination of the multimodal aspects of the Rotterdam Rules (with a focus on 
the carriage of goods by sea and road) 
3.3.1 Article 1.1 and 5 
As noted, the scope of application of the Rotterdam Rules is substantially wider than the 
Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules. Article 1(1) read with the general scope of application 
under article 5 provides that a contract for the international carriage of goods by sea may also 
“provide for carriage by other modes of transport in addition to the sea carriage”.
198
 If the 
carriage is wholly by sea, the Rules apply from the “port of loading” until the goods are 
delivered at the “port of discharge” (provided they are in different states); and if the carriage 
contract envisages other modes of transport in addition to the sea leg, the “place of receipt” 
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and “place of delivery” of the goods are the relevant points.
199
 Either party may reside in a 




3.3.2 Introduction to Article 26 and 82 
An area of controversy during the drafting of the Rules was the potential for conflict with 
other unimodal conventions. Given the fact that there is no multimodal regime currently in 
force that has gained enough success to govern an entire carriage contract with various legs 
involved (such as land and sea), each leg of the voyage is governed by different unimodal 
regimes, depending on the mode of transport used.
201
 Since the Rotterdam Rules extend its 
application to accommodate multiple modes of transport in addition to sea carriage, there is 
potential for conflict with other unimodal conventions or national laws that apply to a 
particular leg of the voyage.
202
 Furthermore, it is also possible for some of the unimodal 
conventions to extend their scope of application to maritime carriage, allowing for further 
conflict and overlap.
203
 In order to address the potential for conflict of the various unimodal 
conventions under a multimodal carriage contract, the Rules contain Articles 26 and 82.  
Article 26 is designed to regulate a situation where both the Rotterdam Rules and another 
unimodal convention apply in respect of a particular leg of the voyage.
204
 Article 82 regulates 
the application of unimodal conventions to maritime carriage.
205
 Articles 26 and 82 will be 
addressed respectively.  
3.3.3 An overview of Article 26 
The Rotterdam Rules, as a maritime Convention, will apply during the sea leg of the voyage; 
however, there may be a situation where both the Rotterdam Rules and another unimodal 
convention may apply in respect of the non-sea leg of the voyage due to the extension of 
scope of application and period of responsibility of the Rotterdam Rules. To avoid these 
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conflicts with other conventions, the Rules have introduced Article 26, a lengthy and 
complex conflict avoiding provision.  
The purpose of Article 26 under the Rotterdam Rules is to resolve possible conflicts that may 
arise between the Rules and other applicable conventions by allowing for the continued 
application of the provisions of other applicable unimodal international conventions (such as 
the CMR and COTIF-CIM) against the carrier for loss, damage or delay where those 
provisions are mandatory (in place of the provisions of the Rotterdam Rules).
206
  Article 26 
reads as follows:  
“When loss of or damage to goods, or an event or circumstance causing a delay in their 
delivery, occurs during the carrier’s period of responsibility but solely before their loading 
onto the ship or solely after their discharge from the ship, the provisions of this Convention 
do not prevail over those provisions of another international instrument that, at the time of 
such loss, damage or event or circumstance causing delay:  
(a) Pursuant to the provisions of such international instrument would have applied to all or 
any of the carrier’s activities if the shipper had made a separate and direct contract with 
the carrier in respect of the particular stage of carriage where the loss of, or damage to 
goods, or an event or circumstance causing delay in their delivery occurred; 
(b) Specifically provide for the carrier’s liability, limitation of liability, or time for suit; and 
(c) Cannot be departed from by contract either at all or to the detriment of the shipper under 
that instrument.” 
Article 26 essentially states that the provisions of the Rotterdam Rules will not apply in a 
situation where loss of or damage to goods or delay occurs solely before loading onto the 
vessel or after discharge from the vessel, provided it occurs during the carrier’s period of 
responsibility and the conditions in Article 26 as outlined above have been met.
207
 It seeks to 
address conflicts between the Rotterdam Rules and other transport conventions that may arise 
in respect of the non-maritime legs of the voyage.
208
 It provides that the carrier’s liability for 
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loss or damage to cargo will be subject to the provisions of another unimodal regime that 
would have applied had a separate hypothetical contract for the inland land leg been 
concluded.
209
 In other words, where loss, damage or delay occurs before loading onto the 
vessel or after discharge from the vessel, the relevant provisions of any other applicable 
international transport convention will take preference over the Rotterdam Rules (provided 
the requirements of Article 26 are met).
210
  
Article 26 introduces a ‘limited network system’ which seeks to remove possible conflicts 
with other unimodal conventions. 
211
 Its provisions have a conflict-avoiding effect
212
 in that 
once the requirements under Article 26 have been met, the liability provisions of the other 
applicable convention are incorporated by reference into the Rotterdam Rules and override 
the liability provisions of the Rotterdam Rules.
213
 The application of the other international 
conventions is, however, limited in that only certain provisions of the convention will apply 
and only under those conditions as per Article 26, as will be more fully discussed below.
214
 
This limited network system differs from other systems that the drafters could have 
implemented, such as a ‘uniform system’ and a ‘full network system’. The uniform system 
provides that only one set of rules will govern a multimodal contract, irrespective of where 
the loss or damage occurs or whether the damage or loss is localised (occurring in one 
particular leg of the voyage).
215
 Had the drafters incorporated the uniform system, the 
Rotterdam Rules would have applied entirely, regardless of where the damage, loss or delay 
occurred and irrespective of any mandatory provisions of any unimodal international 
convention. It also differs from a full network system in that although both systems (limited 
network and full network) divide the carriage into distinct stages (such as the road leg and sea 
leg), the full network system will apply an entire convention depending on which leg the loss, 
damage or delay occurred in, and not simply its liability provisions.
216
 In other words, the 
applicable rules would be determined according to the leg of the voyage where the loss, 
damage or delay occurred and will apply the regime that would have been applicable in 
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respect of that leg of the voyage.
217
 The disadvantage of a full network system is that parties 
must know during which leg of the voyage the damage or loss to the cargo occurred, which is 
often difficult with containerised goods.
218
 Given the disadvantages of the uniform and full 
network system, and for the sake of uniformity, the drafters of the Rotterdam Rules opted for 
a limited network system which allows for the application of other conventions provided they 
meet the conditions of Article 26 and only in respect of certain provisions.
219
 Thus, in a case 
where the damage or loss cannot be localised and therefore a unimodal convention cannot be 
applied, the Rotterdam Rules will apply.
220
  
In order for another transport convention to apply to the leg preceding or following the sea 
leg, certain conditions must be satisfied as per Article 26. The first condition of Article 26 is 
that the loss or damage to the goods or delay must have occurred “solely before their loading 
onto the ship or solely after their discharge from the ship”.
221
 The key term used under this 
condition is ‘solely’ and therefore, where the loss, damage or delay occurs during the sea leg, 
or where the loss or damage cannot be localised; the Rotterdam Rules will apply, and not 
another mandatory law in terms of Article 26.
222
 Furthermore, if for example the damage, 
loss or delay started prior to the sea carriage but worsened thereafter, or if the damage started 
on board the vessel and worsened after discharge (gradually occurring damage), the 
Rotterdam Rules will prevail over any other international instrument in this instance.
223
  
The second condition relates to the hypothetical contract approach adopted by Article 26. In 
order for another convention to apply, such as the CMR in respect of an international road 
leg, it requires that such convention ought to have applied had the shipper “made a separate 
and direct contract with the carrier in respect of the particular stage of carriage where the loss 
of, or damage to goods, or an event or circumstance causing delay in their delivery 
occurred.”
224
 In other words, had the parties entered into a separate and direct contract in 
respect of the leg where the loss, damage or delay occurred, one must ask which convention 
would have applied in that situation. If for example, it is determined that the CMR would 
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have applied, then the liability provisions of the CMR will apply in place of the Rotterdam 
Rules.  
Thirdly, the provisions on the carrier’s liability, limitation of liability and time for suit must 
be mandatory.
225
 In other words, the Rotterdam Rules will only be overridden in respect of 
provisions which cannot be departed from or waived.
226
 Furthermore, it is only those 
provisions that relate to the liability of the carrier for loss, damage or delay that are 
applicable.
227
 These liability provisions, and any liability provisions of any future 
conventions, are incorporated by reference in the Rotterdam Rules.
228
 All other non-liability 




It is also important to note that the Article 26 does not allow for the application of national 
laws. During the negotiations of the UNCITRAL Working Group, it was put forward that 
Article 26 should extend to national laws and not just international conventions; however, 
this was eventually rejected due to concerns that it would negatively affect uniformity, 
transparency and predictability of the Rules.
230
 Therefore, Article 26 only applies when 
another international convention would have applied either before or after the sea leg under a 
contract of carriage, and such leg must be international.
231
 If a situation arises where national 
law would have applied under a hypothetical contract during the leg preceding or following 
the sea leg, then Article 26 does not come into play, and the relevant liability provisions of 
the Rotterdam Rules are applicable (and not the national law).
232
 
Even once all these requirements have been satisfied, the wording of Article 26 is such that a 
court is not obliged to apply the relevant transport convention.
233
 Article 26, once the 
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requirements are met, merely allows the court to apply the provisions of the other 
conventions, but does not force the court to do so.
234
  
3.3.4 An overview of Article 82 
The next important aspect of the Rotterdam Rules regulating multimodal transport is Article 
82, another lengthy and complex provision. It is a conflict of conventions provision used 
“…to avoid any conflicting obligation to apply the provisions of other transport conventions 
that are inconsistent with the Rotterdam Rules”.
235
 Article 82 addresses four categories of 
convention relating to air, road, rail and inland waterway carriage; however, for the purposes 
of this research, regard shall solely be had to carriage by road. Article 82 reads as follows: 
“International conventions governing the carriage of goods by other modes of transport 
Nothing in this Convention affects the application of any of the following international 
conventions in force at the time this Convention enters into force, including any future 
amendment to such conventions, that regulate the liability of the carrier for loss of or damage 
to the goods: 
…(b) Any convention governing the carriage of goods by road to the extent that such 
convention according to its provisions applies to the carriage of goods that remain loaded on a 
road cargo vehicle carried on board a ship;…” 
During the drafting of the Rotterdam Rules, it was evident that Article 26 alone was 
insufficient to address all potential conflicts with existing transport conventions.
236
 It 
eliminates the majority of potential conflict of convention issues; however, there are specific 
situations in which a party may face conflicting obligations under the Rotterdam Rules and 
other international conventions.
237
 Article 82 identifies and addresses such situations and 
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therefore allows for the application of other conventions (over the Rotterdam Rules) in 
certain circumstances as set out from paragraphs (a) to (d) under Article 82.
238
  
Article 82 essentially gives precedence to four categories of convention “to the extent that 
they apply beyond pure unimodal transportation by road, rail, air and inland waterway, 
respectively” (including future amendments to those conventions).
239
 In other words, the 
provisions of the conventions will take priority over the provisions of the Rotterdam Rules in 
the situations set out under Article 82 i.e. where they apply beyond pure unimodal 
transportation.
240
 The relevant conventions are those that are already in force at the time the 
Rotterdam Rules entered in force, including any future amendments to those conventions.
241
 




Article 82(b) identifies a potential area of overlap with the Rotterdam Rules with respect to 
“goods that remain loaded on a road cargo vehicle carried on board a ship”
243
 This section 
identifies a certain type of carriage known as ‘roll-on roll-off carriage’.
244
 Article 82(b) was 
therefore inserted in light of Article 2(1) of the CMR which provides that: 
“Where the vehicle containing the goods is carried over part of the journey by sea…and…the 
goods are not unloaded from the vehicle, this Convention shall nevertheless apply to the 
whole of the carriage.” 
To illustrate the operation of Article 82(b) Kituri
245
 provides a useful example. Parties may 
enter into a contract for the carriage of goods from one destination to another by international 
road carriage, after which the vehicle is to be loaded onto a ship whilst the goods are still 
loaded on the vehicle for sea carriage to another destination.
246
 In this case the goods are 
damaged during the sea leg.
247
 In such a situation, the CMR is applicable to the contract since 
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it involved an international road leg and the parties to the contract are contracting states to the 
Convention.
248
 Furthermore, the CMR is also applicable by virtue of Article 2(1) which 
provides for the application of the CMR to the whole carriage in the case of a roll-on roll-off 
situation.
249
  However, the contract is also subject to the Rotterdam Rules (to which the 
parties are contracting states) by virtue of the international sea leg.
250
 As we can see, there is 
an area of overlap in that both the Rotterdam Rules and the CMR apply to the sea leg of the 
voyage in which the damage to the goods occurred. Article 82(b) resolves this and provides 
that the provisions of the other international Convention (the CMR in this case) take priority 
over the provisions of the Rotterdam Rules.
251
 If, for example, the goods had been offloaded 
from the vehicle first and then loaded onto the vessel, Article 82(b) would not have been 
applicable and the Rotterdam Rules would have applied by virtue of Article 1(1).
252
 Had the 
goods been damaged during the road leg of the voyage, Article 26 would come into play and 
the CMR would be applicable.
253
 
Having examined the multimodal aspects of the Rotterdam Rules, it would be appropriate to 
determine the extent to which the Rules are an appropriate solution to the shortcomings of the 
Hague-Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules. The following paragraphs will therefore 
highlight some of the positive and negative aspects of the Rotterdam Rules, with a focus on 
the multimodal provisions.  
3.4 To what extent is the provision for multimodal transportation under the Rotterdam 
Rules an appropriate solution to the Hague-Visby Rules and Hamburg Rules?  
As we have seen, the scope of application and period of responsibility of the Hague-Visby 
Rules and Hamburg Rules is limited, applying only ‘tackle-to-tackle’ and ‘port-to-port’, 
respectively. This is insufficient to meet the needs of modern trade in which it has become 
increasingly popular for containerised goods to be carried door-to-door and to conclude a 
multimodal carriage contract.
254
 Furthermore, there is currently no convention in force to 
effectively regulate multimodal transport contracts.
255
 As a result of the lack of regulation by 
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a single international instrument over the entire performance of the contract and the fact that 
each mode of transport under a contract of carriage is regulated by a different unimodal 
convention (unless the maritime convention is extended inland as agreed by the parties), there 
is a risk of lack of uniformity, predictability and certainty.
256
 The trade industry has therefore 
felt the need for a single regime to govern the entire carriage of goods by multiple modes of 
transport.
257
 The extension of the scope of application and period of responsibility of the 
carrier under the Rotterdam Rules is therefore considered a significant development and 
improvement over the Hague-Visby Rules and Hamburg Rules.
258
 The Rules not only cover 
contracts for the international carriage of goods by sea, but also multimodal transport 
contracts (provided there is an international sea leg).
259
 However, the multimodal aspects of 
the Rules are not without their concerns, with many organisations and leading academics 
raising particular concerns in this regard.
260
 It is beyond the scope of this research to examine 
each of these concerns fully, however it will be useful to highlight some of the major 
concerns in order to determine the extent to which the provision for multimodal transport 
under the Rules is an appropriate and effective solution to the Hague-Visby Rules and 
Hamburg Rules.  
One of the concerns with regard to the multimodal aspects of the Rotterdam Rules is that it is 
not a fully multimodal regime since the Rules require an international sea leg.
261
 For 
example, the Rules will not apply to a multimodal contract incorporating road and air 
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carriage without a sea leg.
262
 As identified by Professor Tetley, amongst others, the limited 
scope of application undermines one of the very goals of the Rotterdam Rules, which is to 
create a “…binding universal regime to support the operation of contracts of maritime 
carriage involving other modes of transport.”
263
 Thus, by requiring an international sea leg, 
parties looking to conclude a multimodal contract without a sea leg will have to look to other 
regimes to govern their contracts.
264
 Furthermore, the CMI and those responsible for drafting 
the Rules have essentially sea related interests, with a focus on the international carriage of 
goods by sea.
265
 As a result, the Rules have been described as “something of a hybrid” and 
that the multimodal aspects are “incidental and only partially covered.”
266
 It has been argued 
further that by excluding the application of mandatory national law, it will be harmful to 
States with mandatory national laws and this may play a significant factor in their decision to 
adopt the Rules or not.
267
 It is unlikely that States will be willing to abandon their national 
laws governing the carriage of goods in favour of the Rotterdam Rules.
268
 As a result, it is 
contended that the Rules have not been successful in creating a uniform body of rules to 
regulate multimodal contracts of carriage, but have rather added another maritime convention 
to the numerous existing regimes.
269
 
Further concerns were also raised in a report by the UNCTAD secretariat which participated 
in the preparatory work on the Rotterdam Rules. The decision to extend the scope of 
application to cover multimodal contracts (involving a maritime leg) in the Rotterdam Rules 
raised considerable debate and controversy.
270
 This was particularly so for the following 
reasons as highlighted by the UNCTAD report:  
(a) “Concerns about the potential for conflict with unimodal conventions in the field of road, 
rail, air and inland waterway carriage, which in many instances also apply to loss arising 
during a particular stage of a multimodal transport;  
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(b) The desire by some states to ensure the continued application of existing national law on 
multimodal transportation; 
(c) Concerns about further fragmentation of the law applicable to international multimodal 
transportation; and 
(d) The fact that the substantive content of the liability regime is based exclusively on 




With regard to the potential for overlap with other unimodal conventions, point (a) above, 
this has been addressed by Articles 26 and 82, as discussed above.
272
 Article 82 of the Rules 
gives priority to conventions relating to air, road, rail and inland waterway carriage “to the 
extent that they apply beyond pure unimodal transportation.”
273
 Article 26 also provides for 
the application of other conventions in respect of loss, damage or delay that occurs solely 
before or after the sea carriage, however, only in respect of provisions that directly relate to 
the liability of the carrier, limitation of liability, and time for suit that are “contained in any 
international convention that would have applied mandatorily to the stage of carriage where 
the loss occurs, had a separate unimodal transport contract been made”.
274
 The issue that 
arises, however, is that these mandatory provisions will have to be applied with the remaining 
relevant substantive rules contained in the Rotterdam Rules.
275
 For example, if under a 
multimodal contract loss occurs during an international road leg in which the CMR is 
hypothetically applicable, the rules relating to “carrier liability, limitation of liability and time 
for suit” will be determined by the CMR. Every other aspect is to be determined according to 
the Rotterdam Rules, a lengthy and complex Convention (such as jurisdiction, “shipper 
liability, delivery, documentation, rights of suit”).
276
  It is highly unsatisfactory to apply two 
sets of substantive rules to the same matter and could prove to be a difficult task for courts, 
leading to diverging interpretations and outcomes.
277
  
With regard to point (d) above, if there is no applicable unimodal convention, or if the loss 
cannot be localised (which is often the case with containerised goods), the provisions of the 
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Rotterdam Rules will apply to determine the rights, obligations and liability of the parties.
278
 
This is a concern as the Rotterdam Rules are largely a maritime Convention.
279
 There are 96 
Articles in the Rotterdam Rules and only Articles 1, 26 and 82 make reference to carriage by 
other modes of transport.
280
 The rest of the provisions are maritime in nature, with little 
regard to “the application of the Rotterdam Rules in a multimodal transport context”.
281
 Thus, 
a situation could arise under a multimodal contract involving a sea leg where distinctly 
maritime law principles and concepts will regulate the carriage of goods by road, rail and/or 
air.   
Further concerns have also been raised regarding the complexity of the multimodal aspects of 
the Rules as well as drafting deficiencies, allowing for divergent interpretations.
282
 The 
maritime plus approach adopted by the Rules is also not unique since many unimodal 
Conventions have adopted a ‘unimodal plus’ approach which include multimodal aspects.
283
 
As previously discussed, the multimodal nature of the Rotterdam Rules is considered to be 
one of the advantages to its predecessors. Although it is beyond the scope of this research to 
analyse the multimodal aspects of other unimodal conventions, it is worth noting that if other 
conventions similarly contain multimodal aspects, the Rotterdam Rules are clearly not 
revolutionary.  
It is clear that the multimodal aspects of the Rotterdam Rules are not without their concerns, 
with many organisations and leading authors expressing their concerns over the Rotterdam 
Rules. As mentioned previously, the Rules were not originally conceived as a multimodal 
regime, but rather a maritime Convention to replace the outdated Hague-Visby Rules and 
unsuccessful Hamburg Rules.
284
 The decision to extend the scope of application and period of 
responsibility was somewhat of an afterthought.
285
 Thus, it could be argued that it is not the 
multimodal Convention that many had been hoping for.  
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Many leading authors, however, argue in favour of the Rotterdam Rules and the limited 
network system approach adopted by the Rules.
286
  It was never the drafters’ intention to 
create a truly multimodal regime since they lacked the power to draft a fully multimodal 
regime.
287
 It is therefore the intention of the Rules to govern the carriage of goods wholly or 
partly by sea. Further, it is argued that given the extensive time and effort put into drafting 
the Rotterdam Rules, to formulate a completely and fully multimodal instrument that 
harmonises the different legal instruments and the different modes of transport would be 
impractical and almost impossible to achieve.
288
 For example, it would be extremely difficult 
to determine a common limitation of liability provision in the event of loss or damage that 
would suit all modes of transport, particularly since the value of goods carried by the 
different modes of transport varies.
289
 Furthermore, even if such an undertaking were 
attempted, it is uncertain to what extent States would be willing to forgo their current 
domestic laws and unimodal conventions, such as the CMR.
290
 Thus, perhaps the arguments 
that the Rotterdam Rules are not a fully multimodal regime are too harsh and unfounded, 
especially since they have responded to some of the deficiencies in the Hague-Visby Rules 
and Hamburg Rules.
291
 Furthermore, it could be argued that the current situation which 
concerns the application of various carriage regimes and national laws to the same contract is 
more complex than the multimodal solutions offered by the Rotterdam Rules.
292
 The only 
concern that remains is the possibility that the Rules will not achieve widespread acceptance 
if they come into force and will merely add to the list of sea conventions currently in force, 
further impacting on uniformity and certainty.  
3.5 A brief South African perspective 
The relevant maritime convention in South Africa regulating the carriage of goods by sea is 
the Hague-Visby Rules which South Africa gives effect to in the Carriage of Goods by Sea 
Act 1 of 1986 (COGSA) as a schedule to the Act. The South African government, through 
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Operation Phakisa, is now possibly looking to replace the Hague-Visby Rules with the 
Rotterdam Rules should they be widely accepted (Please see footnote 16 for further details). 
One of the aspects that the South African government should take into consideration in 
deciding whether or not to adopt the Rotterdam Rules are the multimodal aspects of the 
Rules, given the potential impact they could have in South Africa. Not only will the Rules 
replace the current Hague-Visby Rules, but also, as we have seen under Article 26, the Rules 
do not extend the application to national law. The National Road Traffic Act
293
 and its latest 
amendments is the most recent attempt by the South African government to regulate the 
carriage of goods by road through domestic legislation.
294
 Should South Africa choose to 
adopt the Rotterdam Rules, national legislation such as the National Road Traffic Act will not 
be applicable in such contracts. And since South Africa is not a party to the CMR, the land 
leg preceding or following the sea leg will be governed by the Rotterdam Rules, a largely 
maritime Convention. Thus, it is important for the South African government to take 
cognisance of the multimodal aspects of the Rules in deciding whether to adopt them or not. 
3.6 Conclusion 
One of the most innovative and significant changes introduced by the Rotterdam Rules is the 
regulation of the carriage of goods by multiple modes of transport, recognising and reflecting 
the realities of modern shipping.
295
 However, whether or not the provision for multimodal 
transport under the Rotterdam Rules is an appropriate solution to the shortcomings of the 
Hague-Visby Rules and Hamburg Rules is debatable.  
The extension of the scope of application and period of responsibility introduced by the 
Rotterdam Rules is considered a step forward and an improvement on the Hague-Visby Rules 
and Hamburg Rules, given their limited scope of application.
296
 In today’s modern trading 
environment, it makes commercial sense to have one regime regulating the entire carriage 
contract between the shipper and carrier, which is what the Rules have attempted to 
achieve.
297
 However, the Rotterdam Rules is not a true multimodal regime, meaning that 
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there may still be a need for the formulation of a fully multimodal regime (bearing in mind 
this may not be possible from a practical perspective).
298
 The decision to extend the scope of 
application of the Rules to cover multimodal contracts was only made later, and perhaps its 
provisions reflect this.
299
 Parties are also still free to limit the scope of application of the 
Convention to ‘tackle-to-tackle’ or ‘port-to-port’.
300
 Furthermore, the multimodal provisions, 
articles 26 and 82, are potentially overly complex and have also raised concerns and 
considerable debate amongst various organisations and academics. If the Rules enter into 
force but are not widely accepted due to concerns over the multimodal aspects of the Rules, 
we will have yet another maritime convention added to those currently in force, further 
frustrating uniformity and creating legal uncertainty. The Rotterdam Rules have also 
generally been criticised by many for their complexity and vagueness.
301
 If States are to adopt 
the Rotterdam Rules, these particular concerns with regard to the multimodal aspects of the 
rules will need to be considered.  
As to whether the Rules are an appropriate and effective solution to the shortcomings of the 
Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules, it cannot be answered with a simple yes or no answer. 
They have both positive and negative aspects that States are to consider when, and if, they 
adopt the Rules. The author is inclined to suggest that since modern trade requires an 
international regime that regulates multimodal carriage and since the Hague-Visby Rules and 
Hamburg Rules are insufficient in this regard, the Rotterdam Rules are an appropriate 
solution to its predecessors at least in the interim. Although the Rotterdam Rules may not be 
the pinnacle of uniformity and perfection, nor the multimodal regime many had hoped for, 
perhaps it is the next best solution.
302
 This is not to say that the Rotterdam Rules in its 
entirety are an appropriate and effective solution to the shortcomings of the Hague-Visby 
Rules and Hamburg Rules. Such an answer would require an examination in light of all its 
provisions, which is beyond the scope of this research. For our purposes, the multimodal 
provisions may be regarded as an appropriate response to the deficiencies of the Hague-Visby 
and Hamburg Rules. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE CARRIER’S SEAWORTHINESS OBLIGATION 
4.1 Introduction 
The success of any maritime venture involving the international carriage of goods by sea is 
dependent on the appropriate allocation of risk between the carrier and shipper, requiring that 
each party be prescribed certain rights and obligations.
303
 One of the most important 
obligations borne by the carrier is that of providing a seaworthy vessel. Given the hazards 
involved in ocean carriage, it is imperative that a vessel is able to withstand such hazards in 
order to protect the environment, cargo on board the vessel, and most importantly, human 
life.
304
  The idea of the carrier providing a seaworthy vessel can be traced as far back as the 
fourteenth century when the carrier was required to take proper care of its client’s cargo.
305
 
As threats to the safety of human life at sea and damage to cargo became more prevalent, 
demands for and the importance of a legal concept of seaworthiness emerged.
306
 The legal 
concept of seaworthiness has since flourished and is a central obligation of the carrier under 
the common law as well as international conventions, including the Hague/Hague-Visby 
Rules and the Rotterdam Rules.
307
 
Under Article III (1) of the Hague-Visby Rules, the carrier is required to exercise due 
diligence before and at the beginning of the voyage to make the vessel seaworthy. Limiting 
the extent of the obligation to only before and at the beginning of the voyage (and not 
throughout the voyage by sea) was suitable for its time due to the lack of control the carrier 
was able to exercise over the vessel once at sea and the inherent risks associated with 
maritime carriage.
308
 However, in today’s modern shipping environment it has been alleged 
that the Rules are out of date and tend to favour carrier interests.
309
 It is argued that there is 
no reason why the carrier should not be obliged to exercise due diligence to make the vessel 
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seaworthy throughout the entire voyage by sea.
310
 The Hamburg Rules adopted a different 
approach and removed the concepts of seaworthiness and due diligence from its text. The 
Hamburg Rules adopt a presumed fault based liability system which provides that the carrier 
will only be excused from liability if it can show that it took all reasonable steps to avoid the 
loss or damage and its consequences.
311
 The Hamburg Rules, however, have not achieved 
widespread success and have not been ratified by any of the large maritime nations.
312
 As a 
result of the shortcomings of the Hague-Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules with regard to 
the carrier’s seaworthiness obligation, the Rotterdam Rules have introduced a significant 
change that requires the carrier to exercise due diligence not only before and at the beginning 
of the voyage, but also during the voyage by sea to make and keep the vessel seaworthy.
313
 
However, there are concerns regarding the extension of the carrier’s seaworthiness obligation 
under the Rotterdam Rules, with arguments that the provisions relating to the carrier’s 
seaworthiness obligation are too complex and do not achieve a balanced allocation of risk, 
particularly with regard to the carrier’s basis of liability and burden of proof.
314
 Furthermore, 
by extending the seaworthiness obligation, it could alter the allocation of risk as between 
carrier and cargo interests, potentially placing too great a burden on the carrier. In this regard 
it is important to determine whether carriers will be able to comply with this extension. 
The following chapter, therefore, will engage in a comparative analysis between the relevant 
provisions of the Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules and the Rotterdam Rules with 
regard to the carrier’s seaworthiness obligation. It will then analyse and explore the 
abovementioned concerns raised regarding the extension of the carrier’s seaworthiness 
obligation under the Rotterdam Rules in order to determine the extent to which the Rules 
have been successful in providing appropriate solutions to the alleged shortcomings of its 
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4.2 A comparative analysis between the Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules and the 
Rotterdam Rules with regard to the carrier’s seaworthiness obligation 
4.2.1 The Hague-Visby Rules 
4.2.1.1 Historical background and general overview 
As discussed previously, under the Common law, the carrier’s liability was strict, with an 
absolute obligation on it to provide a seaworthy vessel which could not be discharged merely 
by proving that it had exercised due diligence.
315
 In British jurisdictions, however, carriers 
were almost entirely free to contract out of their obligations towards the shipper, including 
the obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel.
316
 The obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel 
was an implied term included in the contract of carriage which could only be excluded if 
expressly stated in the contract.
317
 Given the importance of freedom of contract in British 
jurisdictions, if the carrier expressly excluded the implied warranty of seaworthiness, this 
exclusion would be upheld by the courts.
318
 As noted in chapter two dealing with the history 
and development of the carriage of goods by sea conventions, cargo-owning nations and 
consignees were wholly unsatisfied with the carrier’s exploitation of its dominant position.
319
 
This was especially the case with the United States of America which found clauses 
exonerating the carrier from liability as against public policy.
320
 The growing aversion toward 
the carrier and the exploitation of its dominant position lead to the enactment of the US 
Harter Act, out of which was borne the concept of due diligence as a minimum standard of 
seaworthiness.
321
 The Hague and Hague-Visby Rules, with their roots in the Harter Act, have 
retained this obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel.  
Article III of the Hague-Visby Rules sets out the main obligations of the carrier, which 
include the obligation to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy before and at 
the beginning of the voyage. Article III rule 1 accordingly states as follows: 
1. “The carrier shall be bound before and at the beginning of the voyage to exercise due 
diligence to: 
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(a) Make the ship seaworthy. 
(b) Properly man, equip and supply the ship. 
(c) Make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other parts of the ship in which 
the goods are carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation.” 
Under the Hague-Visby Rules the carrier is no longer placed under an absolute obligation to 
provide a seaworthy vessel, but rather has a lesser obligation to exercise due diligence to 
make the vessel seaworthy.
322
  The carrier will therefore not be held liable for the 
unseaworthiness of a vessel unless caused by a failure to exercise due diligence to make the 
vessel seaworthy and such failure is causative of the loss or damage.
323
 Further, the obligation 
is not continuous and the carrier is only required to exercise due diligence to make the vessel 
seaworthy before and at the beginning of the voyage.  This means that the carrier is under no 
obligation to maintain the vessel’s seaworthiness throughout the voyage.
324
 Further, and in 
favour of the carrier, the Hague-Visby Rules contain a list of seventeen exclusions that 
exonerate the carrier from liability provided it has exercised due diligence to make the vessel 
seaworthy.
325
 As a quid pro quo and to protect cargo-owning interests, the carrier is 
prohibited from contracting out of its obligation to exercise due diligence to make the vessel 
seaworthy, even by agreement.
326
 This is evident from Article III (8) which reads as follows: 
“Any clause, covenant or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier or the ship 
from liability for loss or damage to or in connection with goods arising from negligence, fault 
or failure in the duties and obligations provided in this Article or lessening such liability 
otherwise than as provided in these Rules, shall be null and void and of no effect.” 
Having been introduced to the seaworthiness obligation under the Hague-Visby Rules, the 
following paragraphs will now briefly analyse and define certain aspects of this obligation 
under the Hague-Visby Rules. 
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4.2.1.2 Features of the seaworthiness obligation under the Hague-Visby Rules 
‘Seaworthiness’ 
Despite developments and changes in the rules governing the carrier’s obligation to provide a 
seaworthy vessel, the definition of seaworthiness has largely remained the same.
327
  
Therefore, the old jurisprudence on seaworthiness preceding the Hague-Visby Rules is still 




Seaworthiness relates to all aspects that affect a vessel’s ability to undertake the contractual 
voyage.
329
 It requires that “...the ship must be properly designed, constructed, maintained, 
repaired and fitted with all the necessary equipment in proper working order and supplied 
with a properly trained and qualified crew capable of dealing with all of the incidents of a 
voyage...”
330
 Therefore, it includes the physical state of the vessel, but also concerns various 
other factors,
331
 such as: having the necessary documentation; being properly crewed, 
equipped and supplied; a consideration of the particular voyage to be undertaken; and 
whether it is fit to receive and carry the cargo.
332
 It is not just concerned with the ship itself, 
but whether it is also cargo-worthy i.e. whether the vessel is able to carry the specific cargo 
safely and in good condition.
333
  Seaworthiness is not easily defined since what constitutes a 
seaworthy vessel also “varies with the place, the voyage, the class of ship [and] even the 
nature of the cargo”.
334
 It essentially relates to the fitness and ability of the vessel to 
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encounter the ordinary perils of the contemplated voyage.
335
 The case of McFadden v Blue 
Star Line
336
 sets out the test for seaworthiness as follows: 
“A vessel must have that degree of fitness which an ordinary careful and prudent owner 
would require his vessel to have at the commencement of her voyage having regard to all the 
probable circumstances of it...If the defect existed, the question to be put is, would a prudent 
owner have required that it should be made good before sending his ship to sea had he known 
of it? If he would, the ship was not seaworthy within the meaning of the undertaking.”
337
  
In the case of M.D.C., Ltd. v N.V. Zeevaart Maats,
338
 the following was also stated with 
regard to the test for seaworthiness:  
“The test in a case of this kind, of course, is not absolute: you do not test it by absolute 
perfection or by absolute guarantee of successful carriage. It has to be looked at realistically, 
and the most common test is: Would a prudent shipowner, if he had known of the defect, have 
sent the ship to sea in that condition?”
339
  
The seaworthiness test is therefore an objective one and looks at the conduct of a prudent 
ship-owner to determine what course of action it would have employed had it discovered the 
defect in the vessel.
340
 
The flexibility of the test for seaworthiness is clear from the case of The Bunga Seroja
341
 in 
which the following was stated; 
“…seaworthiness is to be assessed according to the voyage under consideration; there is no 
single standard of fitness which a vessel must meet. Thus, seaworthiness is judged having 
regard to the conditions the vessel will encounter. The vessel may be seaworthy for a coastal 
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Whether a vessel is seaworthy is also dependant on the standards required at a particular 
time.
343
 For example, in the case of Bradley v Federal Steam Navigation Company,
344
 it was 
stated: 
“In the law of carriage by sea neither seaworthiness nor due diligence is absolute. Both are 




To summarise, the vessel must have that degree of fitness at the commencement of the 
voyage in order that it is able perform in terms the contract of carriage.
346
 The vessel must be 
seaworthy in terms of its ability and fitness to withstand the ordinary perils of the sea and 
contemplated voyage, and it must be able to carry and deliver the specific cargo safely to the 
point of destination.
347
 There is no single definition of seaworthiness, but we have seen that it 
relates to (but is not limited to) the physical fitness of the vessel. It is also influenced by other 
factors, such as the cargo to be carried, crew, equipment, loading and stowage, 
documentation, the contractual voyage to be undertaken, and the conditions which might be 
encountered on the voyage.
348
 We may specifically look to Article III rule 1 (b) and (c) which 
expands on what is required of seaworthiness in rule 1 sub (a) i.e. sufficiency of crew and 
equipment, and a cargo-worthy vessel.
349
 The vessel need not be in a perfect condition to be 
seaworthy, but it does need to be fit in order to encounter the ordinary perils of the intended 
voyage and does require a consideration of various factors.
350
 The test for seaworthiness is a 
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As we have seen, the standard of the obligation under Article III (1) of the Hague-Visby 
Rules is ‘due diligence’.
352
 This concept was introduced in the 1893 US Harter Act and has 
been adopted in the Hague, Hague-Visby and the Rotterdam Rules.
353
 It is a departure from 
the absolute obligation placed on the carrier to provide a seaworthy vessel under the Common 
law.
354
 It essentially equates to reasonable care and skill and requires the carrier to take all 
reasonable steps and measures as may be necessary to man, equip and make the ship fit to 
undertake the contemplated voyage.
355
 In the case of The Amstelslot,
356
 the court held that 
lack of due diligence is negligence.
357
 In The Kapitan Sakharov
358
 case it was stated: 
“USC was required under art. III, r. 1, of the Hague Rules to exercise due diligence to make 
the vessel seaworthy. The Judge correctly took as the test whether it had shown that it, its 
servants, agents or independent contractors, had exercised all reasonable skill and care to 
ensure that the vessel was seaworthy at the commencement of its voyage, namely, reasonably 
fit to encounter the ordinary incidents of the voyage. He also correctly stated the test to be 
objective, namely to be measured by the standards of a reasonable ship-owner, taking into 
account international standards and the particular circumstances of the problem in hand.”
359 
A clear and single definition of due diligence is not an easy task
360
 and whether or not due 
diligence has been exercised will depend on the particular facts of each case.
361
 What we can 
conclude is that it is an objective test that looks at “the conduct of a reasonably prudent 
carrier at the time of exercising due diligence.”
362
 It is concerned with whether the carrier has 
taken all reasonable measures that could possibly have been taken, in light of the available 
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Is the duty to exercise due diligence delegable? 
The duty of the carrier to exercise due diligence is a personal one and the responsibility of 
such ultimately lies with the carrier.
364
 Thus, if the carrier chooses to delegate its duty to its 
agent, crew or an independent contractor, and such person did not exercise due diligence in 
providing a seaworthy vessel, the carrier will be held liable and cannot rely on the defence 
that it delegated the duty to another person.
365
 In the leading case on this matter, The 
Muncaster Castle
366
, the carrier was held liable for the negligence of an independent 
contractor in effecting repairs to the vessel.
367
 It is authority for the fact that the obligation of 
the carrier to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy is a personal one.
368
 In the 
same case the following was stated by Lord Keith of Avonholm: 
“The carrier cannot claim to have shed his obligation to exercise due diligence to make his 
ship seaworthy by selecting a firm of competent ship-repairers to make his ship seaworthy. 
Their failure to use diligence to do so is his failure. The question, as I see it, is not one of 




A recent South African decision regarding due diligence  
In a recent South African judgment handed down by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the case 
of Viking Inshore Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd
370
, one of the 
issues turned to the question of whether there was a want of due diligence on the part of the 
owners (Viking) of the vessel, the MFV Lindsay (even though it was a marine insurance 
case). The case concerned a tragic collision between the Lindsay, a small fishing vessel, and 
another vessel, a bulk juice carrier, in which the former capsized as a result of the collision.
371
 
The Lindsay was insured by Mutual and Federal under a marine hull insurance policy and the 
appellant (Viking) sought to claim in terms of the policy.
372
  The appellant sought to rely on 
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two clauses known as Inchmaree clauses that provide cover in situations of loss or damage 
caused by negligence of the master, officers and crew.
373
 However, Mutual and Federal 
repudiated liability for the claim on the grounds that the appellant breached a warranty in 
terms of which they would at all times comply with the Merchant Shipping Act, 1951 (MSA) 
and the provisions under the Act relating to the safety and seaworthiness of the vessel.
374
 The 
matter proceeded to the Western Cape Division of the High Court where the appellant’s claim 
was refused based on a written statement of one Mr Ehlers to the effect that only he and one 
Mr Koeries were on navigational watch at the time of the collision (and they did not possess 
the requisite navigational certification), despite the fact that he later recanted his statement.
375
 
The owners took the matter on appeal to the SCA where one of the issues turned to whether 
there was a want of due diligence on the part of the owners of the vessel. The respondent 
denied liability under the policy, specifically the Inchmaree clause in which it states that “The 
cover provided in [this clause] is subject to all other terms, conditions and exclusions 
contained in this insurance and subject to the proviso that the loss or damage has not resulted 
from want of due diligence by the assured, owners or managers”.
376
 The respondent, by 
relying on the statement of Mr Ehlers,  argued that at the time of the collision, a crew member 
who was supposed to be on duty was not present on the bridge where he was supposed to be, 
and therefore the vessel was in the hands of two other persons, Mr Koeries assisted by Mr 
Ehlers.
377
 Neither of these two persons held the requisite certification to undertake a 
navigational watch and as a result, it was alleged that there was a want of due diligence on 
the part of the appellant.
378
 The court ultimately rejected this argument in favour of the 
appellants, finding the statement by Mr Ehlers unreliable.
379
 The court held that a want of due 
diligence must be established on the part of the assured, the owner or the manager of the 
vessel, or their alter ego, rather than a failure by a subordinate (for example, a crew 
member).
380
 Further, the court also stated that want of due diligence is concerned with 
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equipping the vessel for the voyage, as opposed to seagoing and operational negligence,
381
 
which is accordingly in line with the Canadian case of the Brentwood
382
. The following was 
stated in this regard: 
“What must be established is a want of due diligence on the part of the insured, the owner or 
the manager – in this case Viking – causing the loss. And that does not depend on the conduct 
of the crew but on the conduct of those responsible at a higher level of management in the 
company. It must, as Arnould expresses it, ‘be personal failure of the assured, owners or 
managers, or their alter ego in the case of corporate bodies, rather than a failure by a 
subordinate’. Want of due diligence is concerned with equipping the vessel for the voyage 
and not with seagoing or operational negligence, which is one of the perils insured against.”
383
 
The court stated that there were at least two officers on board the vessel who held 
qualifications with regard to navigation and watchkeeping who shared the watches, Captain 
Landers and Mr Levendal.
384
 Even if it was shown that Mr Levendal, who was on duty on the 
evening of the collision, neglected his duties, this would not be the result in a want of due 
diligence on the part of the owners.
385
 However, there was no evidence that this was the case, 
with the court finding Mr Ehler’s statement unreliable.
386
 Furthermore, the court stated that 
the proviso to the Inchmaree clauses in the marine policy operates when the want of due 
diligence was the cause of the loss or damage.
387
 Therefore, even though Mr Koeries and Mr 
Ehlers did not hold any certifications, the court held that there was no evidence that the 
absence of certification would have that causative effect resulting in the loss or damage.
388
 In 
any event the court held that the vessel was crewed in a manner in compliance with the 
requirements of the Safe Manning Regulations and that there is no provision in the MSA or 
regulation under it that requires a special certification for crew to be qualified to participate in 
navigational watch.
389
  As a result, the court was satisfied, based on the evidence, that the loss 
                                                             
381 Ibid 
382 Coast Ferries Ltd v Century Insurance Co of Canada and others [1975] 2 SCR 477. In this case a vessel 
capsized due to the negligent loading of the master, however, it was found that there was a want of due 
diligence on the part of the owner of the vessel in failing to provide the master with certain information – See 
Viking In Shore v Mutual & Federal Insurance Co Ltd op cit note 370 at para 30 pg 17 - 18 
383 Viking In Shore v Mutual & Federal Insurance Co Ltd op cit note 370 at para 29 pg 17 
384
 Ibid para 31 pg 18 
385
 Ibid para 31 pg 18 
386
 Ibid para 32 pg 18 - 19 
387
 Ibid para 45 pg 25 
388
 Ibid para 45 pg 25 - 26 
389 Ibid para 46 pg 26; para 48 pg 27 
54 
 
of the vessel was not due to a want of due diligence and the owners’ appeal was successful 
and they were entitled to an indemnity under the marine hull policy.
390
 
What is meant by the term ‘voyage’?  
The carrier is required to exercise due diligence before and at the beginning of the voyage. 
The term ‘voyage’ has been taken to mean the contractual voyage i.e. from the port of 
loading to the port of discharge as per the bill of lading.
391
 There are various stages within the 
contractual voyage and a vessel can call at various ports for loading and discharging of 
goods.
392
 Under the Common law, the carrier was required to exercise due diligence at the 
beginning of each of the various stages within that voyage.
393
 Under the Hague-Visby Rules, 
however, since the voyage refers to the contractual voyage and not the stages within it, the 
carrier is only required to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy at the port 
where the cargo is loaded.
394
 In The Makedonia the following was held in this regard: 
“I see no obligation to read into the word ‘voyage’ a doctrine of stages, but a necessity to 
define the word itself... ‘Voyage’ in this context means what it has always meant: the 
contractual voyage from the port of loading to the port of discharge as declared in the 




Accordingly, the carrier is not required to exercise due diligence before and at the beginning 
of each stage of the voyage to make the vessel seaworthy and the doctrine of stages does not 
apply under the Hague-Visby Rules. 
When does the obligation commence and when does it cease? 
The duration of the obligation to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy under 
the Hague-Visby Rules is not continuous and is only required before and at the beginning of 
the voyage as per Article III rule 1.  In the Maxine Footwear case it was stated that: 
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“…before and at the beginning of the voyage means the period from at least the beginning of 
the loading until the vessel starts on her voyage. The word ‘before’ cannot in their opinion be 




Determining when the seaworthiness obligation commences is not always a simple task and 
is largely dependent on the particular facts of each case. In the Muncaster Castle,
397
 it was 
stated that the duty will commence when the vessel comes into the carrier’s ‘orbit’.
398
 This 
statement is echoed by Aikens who states that the obligation will commence when the vessel 
comes within the carrier’s control or possession.
399
 It would not make sense for the carrier to 
be responsible before the vessel has even come into its control; however, this does not mean 
that the carrier can ignore any issues with the vessel that occurred before the vessel came 
within its orbit.
400
 Margetson is of the view that if the parties have not yet concluded a 
contract of carriage, there cannot be any obligation on the owners to exercise due diligence to 
make the vessel seaworthy.
401
 Accordingly, the obligation to exercise due diligence only 
starts when the contract of carriage between the carrier and shipper comes into existence. 
Therefore, the contract of carriage will determine when the obligation begins.
402
 It seems 
therefore regard should be had to both when the vessel comes within the carrier’s control and 
when the contract of carriage is concluded in determining when the obligation to exercise due 
diligence commences.  
With regard to the concept of ‘beginning’, Margetson states that the obligation ceases once 
the “ship breaks ground for the purpose of departure”.
403
 In other words, the obligation will 
cease once the voyage commences and the vessel begins to leave the berth and port.
404
 The 
carrier is not required to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy after this 
point.
405
 However, courts may make a finding of unseaworthiness after the vessel has sailed if 
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The carrier’s seaworthiness obligation in terms of Article III (1) has been described as an 
overriding obligation in that the carrier must establish that it exercised due diligence before 
and at the beginning of the voyage to make the vessel seaworthy before it may seek to rely on 
the exceptions under Article IV (2).
407
 If the carrier cannot do so, it must at least show that its 
failure to exercise due diligence was not the cause of the loss.
408
 This overriding obligation 
was expressed in the Maxine Footwear
409
 case where Lord Somervell of Harrow stated: 
“Article III, rule 1 is an overriding obligation. If it is not fulfilled and the non-fulfilment 
causes the damage, the immunities of Art. IV cannot be relied on.”
410
 
The overriding obligation has been interpreted to mean that if the damage is caused by the 
carrier’s non-compliance with Article III rule 1, it may not proceed to rely on the list of 
exceptions under Article IV in order to escape liability.
411
 Where the cause of the damage is 
partly due to a failure to exercise due diligence and partly due to an excepted peril, the carrier 
will be held liable for the entire loss.
412
   
Causation 
In order to determine whether a carrier is liable for cargo loss or damage, the true cause of the 
loss must be established.
413
 If the carrier is seeking to rely on a specific defence, such defence 
must be causative of the loss.
414
 The same may be said with regard to seaworthiness, in that it 
is only relevant insofar as it causes or contributes to the loss or damage.
415
 If unseaworthiness 
did not cause the loss or damage, the carrier will not be held responsible.
416
 And if the 
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exercise of due diligence would not have prevented the vessel being unseaworthy, the carrier 
will accordingly not be held liable.
417
 
Burden of proof 
The burden and order of proof in the event of a cargo claim entails a series of averments 
made by each party, which has been described as the ‘ping-pong’ nature of a cargo claim.
418
 
In terms of the burden of proof, it determines which party is required to prove what. The 
Hague-Visby Rules do not provide for a detailed order of proof,
419
 however, the Rules do 
make it clear in terms of Article IV rule 1 that the burden rests upon the carrier to show that it 
exercised due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy i.e. that it complied with Article III rule 
1. According to Tetley (and not necessarily reflecting the views of all authors
420
), the order of 
proof is as follows: 
“1) The cargo claimant proves his loss and damage in the hands of the carrier. (This is usually 
done by presenting a clean bill of lading issued by the carrier evidencing that the goods 
were received in good condition and subsequently damaged or lost upon discharge
421
); 
2) The carrier must prove the cause of the loss;  
3) The carrier must prove due diligence to make the ship seaworthy before and at the 
beginning of the voyage in respect of the loss;  
4) The carrier must prove one of the exculpatory exceptions of art. 4(2)(a) to (q) of the Hague 
or Hague/Hague-Visby Rules.  
5) The cargo claimant then attempts to prove lack of care of cargo or attempts to disprove the 
above evidence of the carrier, including lack of seaworthiness and lack of due diligence.  
6) Both parties then have various arguments available to them.” 
422
 
As per the above, the cargo-claimant is first required to show loss of or damage to the cargo 
whilst in the carrier’s charge.
423
 The burden then shifts to the carrier to explain how such loss 
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 Thereafter, the burden remains with the carrier and is required to 
prove that the vessel was seaworthy or that it exercised due diligence to make the vessel 
seaworthy.
425
 Once having achieving this, it will then be able to prove that the cause of loss 




The reason for the order of proof as above, as per Tetley, is due to the fact that the obligation 
under Article III (1) is an overriding one, and accordingly, the carrier cannot seek to rely on 
the exceptions until it has complied with its obligation under Article III (1).
427
 Furthermore, 
proof as to the cause of the loss or damage to the cargo is more readily available to the carrier 
than the cargo-claimant, accordingly the carrier is in the better position to prove such and 
bear the burden in this regard.
428
 
4.2.1.3 Why is there a need for reform? 
When the Hague Rules were drafted, the decision to limit the extent of the carrier’s 
seaworthiness obligation to only before and at the beginning of the voyage was logical and 
reasonable for its time given the risky nature of sea carriage and the fact that the carrier had 
little control over the vessel once it was at sea.
429
 However, due to developments in and the 
growth of the shipping industry, the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules are considered outdated 
in modern times.
430
 The carrier’s seaworthiness obligation has remained unchanged since the 
adoption of the Hague Rules in 1924 and has therefore not developed in light of 
advancements in the shipping industry. In the modern shipping environment, advancements 
in technology and communications have allowed ship-owners and other personnel on shore to 
remain in constant contact with their vessels.
431
 Any defects to the vessel that compromises 
its seaworthiness may be corrected expediently at the nearest port.
432
 These advancements in 
shipping equipment, communications and safety standards
433
 mean that there is nothing 
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preventing the carrier from exercising due diligence to keep the vessel seaworthy throughout 
the voyage.
434
 As a result of the limited seaworthiness obligation under the Rules, the carrier 
is not required to exercise due diligence to ensure the seaworthiness of the vessel during the 
sea voyage, even if it could have done so to avoid the loss or damage.
435
 Furthermore, due to 
the limited nature of the seaworthiness obligation and the host of exceptions available to the 
carrier, including the controversial nautical fault exception, the Rules are perceived as being 
carrier friendly, favouring developed nations with large maritime fleets.
436
 Therefore, there 
has been call for a new and updated international carriage of goods by sea regime.  
4.2.2 The Hamburg Rules 
4.2.2.1 General overview 
As noted under the Hague-Visby Rules, the requirements for a seaworthy vessel are 
essentially laid out in Article III rule 1 (a) through (c).
437
 One of the concerns in this regard is 
that it possibly limits the courts’ ability to expand on the definition of seaworthiness in light 
of developments in the shipping industry.
438
 The Hamburg Rules therefore opted for a 
different approach and adopted a general seaworthiness provision.
439
 Accordingly, the text of 
Articles III rule 1 and IV of the Hague-Visby Rules do not feature in the Hamburg Rules and 
have been replaced with Article 5(1). Article 5(1) sets out the basis of liability of the carrier 
as follows: 
“The carrier is liable for loss resulting from loss of or damage to the goods, as well as from 
delay in delivery, if the occurrence which caused the loss, damage or delay took place while 
the goods were in his charge as defined in article 4, unless the carrier proves that he, his 
servants or agents took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence 
and its consequences.” 
Article 5(1) was drafted with the views of shippers/cargo interests in mind and that carriers 
should be held liable for all loss, damage and/or delay caused as a result of their own fault or 
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that of their servants and agents.
440
 Accordingly, the drafters of the Hamburg Rules, in the 
form of Article 5(1), adopted a presumed fault based liability system
441
 that imposes a 
positive duty on the carrier to take all reasonable steps to avoid loss, damage or delay from 
the moment it takes the goods into its charge until they are delivered to the consignee.
442
 This 
presumed fault based system means that the carrier is presumed to be at fault for loss or 
damage to the goods or for delay unless it proves that “he, his servants or agents took all 
measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences.”
443
 
This is evident from a post clause inserted at the end of the Hamburg Rules that states as 
follows: 
“It is the common understanding that the liability of the carrier under this Convention is based 
on the principle of presumed fault or neglect. This means that, as a rule, the burden of proof 




Thus, if the shipper can show that the loss, damage or delay took place whilst the goods were 




As noted from the wording of Article 5(1), the Hamburg Rules do not specifically provide for 
a seaworthiness provision, but rather adopt a general provision for the carrier’s liability.
446
 
And although the text of Article 5(1) of the Hamburg Rules excludes the terms 
‘seaworthiness’ and ‘due diligence’; the basic obligations of the carrier in terms of 
seaworthiness of the vessel and care of the goods are impliedly included in this provision.
447
 
The obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel under Article 5(1) has also been made 
continuous due to the wording of Article 5(1) and is not limited to only before and at the 
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The Hamburg Rules have also removed the list of exceptions that were available to the carrier 
under the Hague-Visby Rules, including the contentious nautical fault defence.
449
 Article 5 of 
the Hamburg Rules only provides for certain circumstances in which the carrier will be 
exempted from liability, for example, in the case of fire, damage to or loss of live animals, 
and damage or loss caused as a result of measures taken to save life or property at sea.
450
 
However, despite the lack of express exceptions to liability as contained in the Hague-Visby 
Rules, it has been suggested that the impact of its removal from the Hamburg Rules is 
minimal and the exceptions are impliedly retained (with the exception of the nautical fault 
defence).
451
 The carrier is accordingly not prevented from asserting one of the defences from 
the Hague-Visby Rules as a defence under the Hamburg Rules, as long as it is able to show 
that it, its servants or agents were not at fault.
452
 In other words, if the carrier is able to show 
that the loss, damage or delay is not caused by its own or its servants or agents fault, but 
rather some other circumstance which happens to be a defence listed under the Hague-Visby 
Rules, such as an act of war or an act of God, the carrier will be entitled to rely on such in 
order to escape liability.
453
 Therefore, despite their abolition from the Hamburg Rules, the 
carrier is still entitled to rely on the list of defences under the Hague-Visby Rules to the 
extent that they do not involve fault on the carrier’s part.
454
  
4.2.2.2 Why is there a need for reform? 
Despite attempts by the Hamburg Rules to achieve a balance between the interests of the 
carrier and shipper in terms of their obligations and liability, the Rules have not achieved 
wide-spread success with very few nations having ratified the Rules (of which none include 
any large maritime trading nations with significant influence).
455
 The Rules have generally 
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been opposed by ship-owning nations and carrier interests who fear that the Rules increase 
the carrier’s liability whilst unduly favouring cargo interests.
456
 The removal of carrier 
friendly elements under the Hague-Visby Rules, such as the list of exceptions, and the change 
in the burden of proof are considered too radical and unreasonable, which may result in an 
increase in freight rates.
457
  Further, opponents of the Rules contend that they too readily 
discard and contrast existing laws, such as the widely accepted Hague-Visby Rules, which 
could result in uncertainty and increased litigation over the interpretation of its provisions.
458
 
The abandonment of well-established principles under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, which 
have been subject to years of scrutiny and judicial review, such as those relating to 
seaworthiness and the list of exceptions, has been criticised by opponents of the Rules.
459
 It is 
argued that to simply do away with the settled jurisprudence on the carriage of goods by sea 
by ratifying the completely novel Hamburg Rules will set maritime law back in a very 
significant way.
460
 As a result, the Rules have not been well received by the international 
community and any of the large maritime nations.
461
 
4.2.3 The Rotterdam Rules 
4.2.3.1 General overview 
As we have seen under the Hague-Visby Rules, the carrier has a basic obligation to exercise 
due diligence only before and at the beginning of the voyage to make the vessel seaworthy. 
Under the Hamburg Rules, there is no express seaworthiness obligation, but rather the Rules 
adopt a general carrier liability provision. With the failure of the Hamburg Rules to achieve 
widespread success and arguments that the Hague-Visby Rules are outdated in modern times 
and tend to favour carrier interests, the Rotterdam Rules have sought to modernise and update 
the carrier’s obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel. Under the Rotterdam Rules, the carrier 
is now not only obliged to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy before and at 
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the beginning of the voyage, but also throughout the entire sea voyage.
462
 Article 14 of the 
Rotterdam Rules accordingly states as follows: 
“The carrier is bound before, at the beginning of, and during the voyage by sea to exercise 
due diligence to: 
(a) Make and keep the ship seaworthy; 
(b) Properly crew, equip and supply the ship and keep the ship so crewed, equipped and 
supplied throughout the voyage; and 
(c) Make and keep the holds and all other parts of the ship in which the goods are carried, 
and any containers supplied by the carrier in or upon which the goods are carried, fit and 
safe for their reception, carriage and preservation.” 
Given the shortcomings of the Hague-Visby Rules and Hamburg Rules, the extension of the 
seaworthiness obligation is considered a significant change and a positive step toward 
achieving modernity in the rules governing the international carriage of goods by sea. 
However, the extension under the Rotterdam Rules is not without its concerns, with 
arguments that its provisions relating to the carrier’s basis of liability and burden of proof are 
overly complex and that they fail to achieve an appropriate allocation of risk between carrier 
and shipper. Accordingly, it is imperative that these provisions relating to the carrier’s basis 
of liability and burden of proof are examined to determine whether there is any truth to these 
arguments. Furthermore, the extension under Article 14 may see an alteration of the 
allocation of risk as between carrier and shipper, potentially placing too great a burden on the 
carrier. It is therefore necessary to determine what impact, if any, the extension of the 
carrier’s seaworthiness obligation will have on the carrier and whether it would be able to 
comply with this perceived increase in liability. An examination as to whether the basis of 
liability and burden of proof are overly complex, and the impact the extension will have on 
carrier liability, if any, will assist in determining whether the Rules have been successful in 
providing appropriate solutions to the shortcomings of the Hague-Visby Rules and Hamburg 
Rules. Accordingly, the following paragraphs will briefly examine the provisions relating to 
the seaworthiness obligation under the Rotterdam Rules. It will then examine the above 
issues and will determine the extent to which the extension of the seaworthiness obligation 
under the Rotterdam Rules is an appropriate solution to its predecessors.  
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4.2.3.2 Features of the seaworthiness obligation under the Rotterdam Rules 
With the lack of success of the Hamburg Rules and a desire to avoid a similar fate, the 
drafters of the Rotterdam Rules
463
 adopted a seaworthiness obligation similar in wording and 
construction to that of Article III rule 1 of the Hague-Visby Rules, as may be seen above.
464
 
The obligation is one of exercising due diligence and is not an absolute obligation.
465
 It 
similarly imposes an obligation on the carrier to exercise due diligence to ensure the 
seaworthiness of the vessel with regard to: the physical state of the vessel; sufficient crew and 
equipment; and the cargo-worthiness of the vessel.
466
 The Rotterdam Rules have also gone 
further in that the carrier must also ensure the seaworthiness of the vessel by providing a 
container
467
 that is fit and safe to receive, carry and preserve the cargo.
468
 Furthermore, the 
seaworthiness obligation under the Rotterdam Rules has been made continuous.
469
 This 
means that the carrier is required to exercise due diligence before, at the beginning of, and 
during the voyage by sea to make and keep the vessel seaworthy.
470
 This continuous 
seaworthiness obligation means that if at any point during the sea leg of the voyage the vessel 
becomes unseaworthy, the carrier would be required to take all reasonable steps as may be 
necessary to ensure the seaworthiness of the vessel, and not just before and at the beginning 
of the voyage.
471
 Similarly, the Rules have also retained a list of exceptions that the carrier 
may rely in order to be excused from liability under Article 17(3), excluding the contentious 
nautical fault defence. 
Since the seaworthiness obligation under Article 14 the Rotterdam Rules does not appear to 
differ substantially in wording and construction from that of Article III rule 1 of the Hague-
Visby Rules, the current jurisprudence on the Hague-Visby Rules with regard to concepts 
such as ‘seaworthiness’, ‘before and at the beginning’, and ‘due diligence’ are still relevant 
and may be applied in interpreting the Rotterdam Rules. This has the benefit of maintaining 
some of the certainty and predictability created by the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules.
472
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Thus, the following paragraphs will highlight some of the changes introduced by the 
extended seaworthiness obligation under the Rotterdam Rules. 
The extension of the seaworthiness obligation 
As noted, the obligation to make the vessel seaworthy has been made a continuous one under 
the Rules by virtue of the words “during the voyage by sea to exercise due diligence to make 
and keep the vessel seaworthy.”
473
 However, the Rules are silent as to when the obligation to 
make and keep the vessel seaworthy during the voyage ceases and this could lead to 
divergent interpretations.
474
 Since the term ‘voyage’ has been interpreted to mean the 
contractual voyage, one view is that the obligation ceases once the vessel is at the port of 
destination as agreed to by the parties.
475
 Another view is that since the carrier is required to 
exercise due diligence during the time the cargo is loaded onto the vessel, it is argued that 
there is no reason why the obligation should not extend to the time when the cargo is 
discharged from the vessel.
476
 Another view, and perhaps the most sound, suggests that when 
interpreting the words ‘during the voyage by sea’, one must take cognisance of the other 
provisions of the Rules, such as the obligation of the carrier to deliver the cargo and that the 
period of responsibility of the carrier may end after the cargo has been delivered to the 
consignee.
477
 Since the obligations of the carrier include delivering and unloading the cargo, 
it is argued that the carrier therefore also has a duty to ensure the seaworthiness of the vessel 
during the unloading of the cargo, but the diligence required by the carrier here is limited to 
the requirements of unloading the cargo.
478
 
The burden of proof 
Central to the carrier’s seaworthiness obligation under the Rotterdam Rules is the basis of the 
carrier’s liability and the burden of proof as set out in Article 17. As mentioned, it has been 
suggested that the basis of liability and burden of proof under article 17 of the Rules is overly 
complex and fails to achieve the appropriate allocation of risk many had hoped for. As a 
                                                             
473 Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules 
474 T Aladwani ‘The supply of containers and ‘seaworthiness’ – The Rotterdam Rules perspective’ (2011) 42 (2) 
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 200 
475
 Bengtsson op cit note 308 at 27; J Bülent Sözer ‘Obligation of the carrier to make and keep the ship 
seaworthy: Some comments on art. 14 of the Rotterdam Rules’ 2014 available at 
http://www.dikeyinternational.com/files/Obligation-of-the-Carrier.pdf accessed on 12 January 2016, 8 
476
 Bengtsson op cit note 308 at 27 
477
 Bülent Sözer op cit note 475 at 8 
478 Ibid 8 
66 
 
result, Article 17 will be examined below in determining whether there is any validity to 
these claims.  
4.3 To what extent is the extension of the carrier’s seaworthiness obligation under the 
Rotterdam Rules an appropriate solution to the Hague-Visby Rules and the 
Hamburg Rules?  
Having briefly examined the features of the seaworthiness obligation under the Rotterdam 
Rules, the following paragraphs will examine the concerns with the Rules as raised above in 
order to determine whether the Rules have provided an appropriate solution to the 
shortcomings of the Hague-Visby Rules and Hamburg Rules.  
4.3.1 Concerns regarding the basis of liability and burden of proof under the Rotterdam 
Rules 
Neither the Hague-Visby nor the Hamburg Rules fully regulate the burden of proof of the 
carrier and cargo claimant.
479
 In contrast, however, Article 17 of the Rotterdam Rules sets out 
in the detail the burden of proof of the carrier and the cargo claimant and at any given stage 
either party is aware of the burden of proof or counter-proof that it bears.
480
 Given the fact 
that the burden of proof is inextricably linked to the carrier’s seaworthiness obligation, the 
following paragraphs will briefly engage in an analysis of the relevant aspects of Article 17 
of the Rotterdam Rules.  
As with the Hague-Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules, the basis of liability under the 
Rotterdam Rules is fault, however, the Rules adopt an entirely different approach to that of 
the Hague-Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules.
481
 Under the Rotterdam Rules the initial 
burden rests upon the cargo claimant to assert that the loss, damage or delay took place 
during the carrier’s period of responsibility.
482
 Once the claimant has discharged this initial 
burden, the carrier is presumed at fault and the burden then shifts to the carrier to rebut this 
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 The carrier is then entitled to show either: that its fault did not contribute to 
the loss; or that the loss was due to one of the exceptions listed under Article 17(3), which is 
unlike the Hague-Visby Rules that requires the carrier to prove that it has exercised due 
diligence before relying on one of the excepted maritime exceptions.
484
 If the carrier is unable 
to prove either of the two factors discussed above, the presumption of fault will be upheld 
and the carrier will be held liable for the loss, damage or delay.
485
 If the carrier is able to 
show that the cause of the loss, damage or delay was due to one of the listed exceptions under 
Article 17(3), the claim does not end and the action would continue into a second round of 
proof and counter-proof,
486
 and the claimant must prove:  
(a) “…The fault of the carrier or of a person referred to in article 18 caused or contributed to the 
event or circumstance on which the carrier relies;”
487
 or 
(b)  “...That an event or circumstance not listed in paragraph 3 of this article contributed to the 
loss, damage or delay and the carrier cannot prove that this event or circumstance is not 
attributable to its fault or to the fault of any person referred to in article 18;”
488
 or 
(c) “...That the loss, damage or delay was or was probably caused by or contributed to by...the 




If the claimant chooses to prove option (a) above and does so successfully, the claim ends 
there and the carrier will be held liable for the loss, damage or delay.
490
 If the claimant 
chooses to proceed in terms of option (b) above, the carrier would presumed to be at fault and 
would be given the opportunity to prove that such event or circumstance was not attributable 
to its fault or that of any person for whom it is responsible.
491
 If the carrier is unable to do so, 
the presumed fault will be upheld and will accordingly be held liable for the loss, damage or 
delay.
492
 If the claimant chooses to proceed in terms of option (c) above and is successful in 
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this regard, the carrier will be presumed to be at fault, and will be given the opportunity to 
prove that unseaworthiness did not cause the loss, damage or delay, or it could prove that it 
exercised due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy.
493
 If the carrier is not successful in this 




Article 17 is a lengthy and complex text. It considered one of the most significant changes 
introduced by the Rules and differs quite substantially to the Hague-Visby and Hamburg 
Rules.
 495
 The issue that arises with the extension of the seaworthiness obligation accordingly 
lies not in the wording or construction of Article 14, but rather in terms of the basis of the 
carrier’s liability and burden of proof under the overly complicated Article 17 which will be 
discussed below. 
As we have seen under the Hague-Visby Rules, the seaworthiness obligation is an overriding 
obligation. This means that the carrier must prove first that it exercised due diligence to make 
the vessel seaworthy before it can seek to rely on the list of exceptions in terms of Article 
IV.
496
 However, the wording and construction of Article 17 of the Rotterdam Rules suggests 
that the exceptions are no longer subject to the seaworthiness obligation and that the 
seaworthiness obligation is no longer an overriding one.
497
 In other words, the carrier does 
not need to show that it exercised due diligence to make and keep the vessel seaworthy before 
it may seek to rely on one of the exceptions to be exonerated from liability. Accordingly, it 
can invoke one of the exceptions to liability before proving that it exercised due diligence to 
make and keep the vessel seaworthy. The seaworthiness obligation is therefore only relevant 
when “the cargo claimant could prove unseaworthiness as a cause of damage to rebut the 
carrier’s invocation of one of the excepted perils.”
498
 This is a major concern with the Rules 
and places a great burden on the cargo claimant to show the unseaworthiness of the vessel to 
rebut the carrier’s invocation of one of the exceptions. It would be extremely difficult for the 
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cargo claimant to gain access to the required information to prove such, for example, it may 
not have access to “...the crew that were on board the vessel during the voyage, practices, 
documents, and procedures used and followed during the voyage.”
499
 And it is unlikely that 
the carrier will be accommodating and forthcoming with such information.
500
 Even if the 
claimant is able to overcome this herculean task and manages to obtain the required 
information, the carrier is still given a further opportunity to escape liability by proving that 
none of the factors in Article 17.5 (a) caused the loss, damage or delay; or that it complied 
with its obligation to exercise due diligence.
501
  
The above analysis has shown that not only are the Rules overly complex and too detailed, 
they are also significantly flawed and have been criticised by many academics.
502
 Instead of 
increasing the liability of the carrier to better allocate the risks as between shipper and carrier, 
the Rules place a great burden on the shipper. This is a major concern with the Rules as they 
have failed to respond to concerns that the Hague-Visby Rules tend to favour carrier interests. 
As a result, the Rules ought to have adopted a burden of proof similar to that of the Hague-
Visby Rules which would have retained the overriding nature of the seaworthiness obligation. 
This would have also had the benefit of retaining the status quo, thereby promoting certainty 
and uniformity, and allowing for ease of transition between the Hague-Visby Rules and the 
Rotterdam Rules. As a result, it is submitted that Article 17 under the Rotterdam Rules is a 
major setback to the Hague-Visby and the Hamburg Rules and does not constitute an 
appropriate and effective solution to their shortcomings.  
4.3.2 The impact the extension of the seaworthiness obligation will have on the carrier 
One of the concerns with regard to the extension of the carrier’s seaworthiness obligation is 
that it would unduly increase the liability of the carrier.
503
 It has been suggested that the 
extension would shift the allocation of risk between the carrier and cargo claimant, unfairly in 
favour of the cargo claimant, potentially placing too great a burden on the carrier and 
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resulting in increased freight rates.
504
 There were also concerns regarding the practicality of 
complying with the obligation once the vessel is at sea.
505
 If a vessel experiences a problem 
whilst it is in the middle of the ocean, it may not be possible or practical to remedy the 
problem and ensure its seaworthiness until it has reached a port of call.
506
 However, 
Sooksripaisarnkit contends that the extension may not have as great an impact on the carrier’s 
current practices as was initially believed.
507
  
In the modern shipping environment, there has been a move toward enhancing safety at sea 
and the protection of the environment.
508
 This is evident in the International Management 
Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (ISM Code); an 
international instrument adopted by the International Maritime Organisation in 1993, and 
later incorporated into the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea Convention 
(SOLAS) 1974.
509
 It is a safety regime which sets out maritime safety management standards 
for ship-owners and operators and requires that every ship-owner put into place its own safety 
management system.
510
 It also requires companies to adopt measures to ensure the safe 
management of vessels at shore and at sea, which includes the obligation to ensure that the 
vessel is seaworthy throughout the voyage by sea.
511
 Through an observation of the relevant 
provisions of the ISM code, particularly Articles 6 and 10, it is evident that the code 
“establishes an international standard of seaworthiness throughout the voyage by sea”.
512
 The 
carrier’s duty to provide a seaworthy vessel throughout the voyage by sea under Article 14 of 
the Rotterdam Rules is likened to the obligations imposed by the ISM code.
513
 It is suggested, 
therefore, that compliance with the ISM code is equal to exercising due diligence to make the 
vessel seaworthy throughout the voyage (including the duties regarding crew, equipment, and 
supplying the ship throughout the voyage by sea).
514
 On the other hand a failure to comply 
with the ISM code and the safety management systems resulting in cargo loss or damage is 
prima facie evidence of unseaworthiness of the vessel and a lack of due diligence.
515
 And 
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since the code has been in place for more than a decade and compliance is obligatory on all 
163 signatory states of SOLAS, carriers are well aware of its provisions and are obliged to 
comply with such.
516
 Accordingly, there is no reason why the carrier would not be able to 
comply with the extended seaworthiness obligation since they already have similar 
obligations that they are obliged to comply with under the ISM code.
517
  
Furthermore, it is argued that there is no reason why carriers would not be able to comply 
with an extended seaworthiness obligation given the developments in technology and 
communications in the shipping industry. The rationale for limiting the seaworthiness 
obligation to only before and at the beginning of the voyage was suitable for its time due to 
the lack of control that the carrier exercised over its vessel once at sea.
518
 Given the 
developments in communications and technology, ship-owners are able to exercise greater 
control over their vessels as they are now in constant visual and verbal contact with their 
vessels allowing them to stay up to date and provide instructions as need be.
519
 Ship-owners 
also have a number of contacts worldwide, allowing for defects and issues that may 
compromise the seaworthiness of the vessel to be corrected expediently at the nearest port.
520
 
Advancements in the shipping industry have also provided safer ships, up-to-date navigation 
equipment and more precise weather forecasts.
521
 Arguments that the obligation imposes too 
great a burden on the carrier are defeated further by the fact that the duty imposed is only one 
of due diligence and is not an absolute one.
522
 This means that the carrier need only take 
reasonable steps to keep the vessel seaworthy during the voyage.
523
 It is an objective test 
which looks at what a reasonable ship-owner would have done, taking into account the 
particular circumstances of that case (such as whether the vessel is at sea or in port).
524
 The 
carrier also already has a continuous obligation in terms of care of the cargo under Article III 
rule 2 the Hague-Visby Rules. Thus, it is contended that the extension of the seaworthiness 
obligation would have very little impact on the carrier in practice given these advancements 
in the shipping industry which have made sea carriage safer and more precise, and allows the 
carrier to exercise greater control over its vessel. 
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In this regard, it is submitted that the carrier would be able to comply with an extended 
seaworthiness obligation and it would not be unduly burdensome given the advancements in 
the shipping industry and the fact that the carrier already has similar obligations by virtue of 
the stringent safety standards that are already in force. This may be seen as a positive point 
that the Rules reflect the advancements in the shipping industry and are in line with modern 
shipping practices and stringent safety standards. However, if this is the case, it raises doubts 
as to whether it is worth going through all the effort of ratifying a new and complex 
Convention if it merely re-iterates what is already in practice and what the carrier is already 
required to comply with in terms of its safety obligations. The Rules do not appear to have 
introduced anything revolutionary in this regard but are merely re-iterating international 
safety standards already in place. The issues with the basis of liability and burden of proof in 
terms of Article 17 are also a major cause for concern. As a result, it is submitted that the 
extended seaworthiness obligation under the Rotterdam Rules is not necessarily a novel or 
appropriate solution to the shortcomings of the Hague-Visby Rules and Hamburg Rules. 
Therefore, an amendment to the Hague-Visby Rules through protocol would be the best 
solution in order for the Hague-Visby Rules to reflect the advancements in the shipping 
industry and safety standards, thereby allowing for the retention of the burden of proof under 
the Hague-Visby Rules. 
4.4 Conclusion  
One of the aims of the Rotterdam Rules is the harmonisation and modernisation of the rules 
governing the international carriage of goods by sea.
525
 In this regard, the Rules have 
introduced significant changes in light of modern commercial practices and technologies.
526
 
One of the most significant changes attempted by the Rules is the extension of the carrier’s 
obligation to exercise due diligence to make and keep the vessel seaworthy. Given the fact 
that the Hague-Visby Rules are considered outdated in modern times and tend to favour 
carrier interests, and that the Hamburg Rules have failed to achieve wide-spread acceptance, 
the extension is thought to be a welcomed change. However, the provisions relating to the 
seaworthiness extension under the Rules are not without its concerns.  
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The major concern with the Rules lies in the basis of the carrier’s liability and burden of 
proof which has effectively removed the overriding nature of the seaworthiness obligation 
under the Hague-Visby Rules. It is submitted that Article 17 is overly complicated and 
instead of enhancing the carrier’s liability in order to better allocate the risk as between 
shipper and carrier, it has the opposite effect of placing too great a burden on the cargo-
interest to show that the cause of the loss or damage was probably due to the unseaworthiness 
of the vessel. Concerns were also raised as to what impact the extension will have on the 
liability of the carrier; however, these concerns have been defeated in light of stringent safety 
practises with which carriers are required to comply, such as the ISM code, as well as 
advancements in technologies and communications. This raises doubts as to whether it is 
worth adopting a new and complex Convention when its provisions are merely a reflection of 
what carriers are already required to comply with. As a result, it cannot be concluded that the 
Rules have been successful in providing an appropriate solution that addresses the 
shortcomings of the Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules adequately with regard to the carrier’s 
seaworthiness obligation. The best solution may be an amendment of the Hague-Visby Rules 
in order to cater for the advancements in technology and to reflect the safety measures 














CHAPTER FIVE: THE NAUICAL FAULT DEFENCE 
5.1 Introduction 
One of the most controversial and longstanding exceptions to liability available to the carrier 
is a defence commonly known as the nautical fault defence, which exempts the carrier from 
liability due to the negligence of its employees in the navigation or management of the ship. 
The defence was first successfully introduced into legislation in the US Harter Act, and over 
a hundred years later it may still be found in its most recent form in Article IV(2) of the 
Hague-Visby Rules. 
Historically, the defence was justified on the grounds that carriers were unable to exercise 
control over their vessels once at sea, largely leaving the master and crew to act in their own 
judgment.
527
 It was a time when “cargo was carried in wooden sailing ships whose course 
was subject to the winds, reliable charts were few, navigational aids could not yet cope with 
cloudy weather and uncharted shoals, and ship-owners could not communicate with ships at 
sea.”
528
 In the words of Sellers L.J. in the Lady Gwendolen: 
“Navigation of a ship at sea is so much in the hands of the master, officers and crew and so 
much out of the control of the owners that failure of an owner to establish no actual fault or 
privity in respect of navigation itself is exceptional and striking.”
529
 
As a result, it was only fair that the carrier be excused from liability for events and 
consequences that it had no control over. Accordingly, the defence played an important role 
in the shipping industry and served as an acceptable compromise between carrier and shipper 
for years.
530
 However, despite its historical justification and it being firmly rooted in the laws 
governing the carriage of goods by sea, the defence in recent years has become subject to 
considerable debate and many have called for its removal. Advancements in technology and 
telecommunications in the modern shipping environment have defeated the historical 
rationale for the defence, and many claim it has created an imbalance between the interests of 
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the carrier and shipper, unduly favouring the former.
531
 In this regard the Hamburg Rules and 
Rotterdam Rules have responded by excluding the defence from their provisions.  
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to engage in an analysis of the defence under the 
Hague-Visby Rules and to determine the extent to which its removal from the Hamburg and 
Rotterdam Rules is an appropriate solution to the Hague-Visby Rules. In other words, to what 
extent is the deletion of the nautical fault defence in the modern shipping environment an 
appropriate solution? 
5.2 A comparative analysis between the Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules and the 
Rotterdam Rules with regard to the nautical fault defence 
5.2.1 The Hague-Visby Rules 
5.2.1.1 Historical background and general overview  
Under the Hague-Visby Rules, Article IV (2) contains a list of seventeen exceptions 
exonerating the carrier from liability provided it has exercised due diligence to make the 
vessel seaworthy under Article III. The first of these exceptions is the nautical fault defence, 
which provides as follows: 
“Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or resulting 
from: 
a. Act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot or the servants of the carrier in the 
navigation or in the management of the ship.” 
The nautical fault defence is a long standing exception to liability which has existed for over 
a hundred years.
532
 As shown in previous chapters, during the 19
th
 century, carriers would 
insert clauses into their bills of lading exonerating themselves from liability, even for their 
own negligence.
533
 Originally, the defence only provided for exemption from liability for 
errors in navigation, however, as the carriers bargaining power increased, the defence 
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expanded over time to include errors in the management of the vessel as well.
534
 The carrier 
was in such a great bargaining position that eventually it was able to limit its liability almost 
entirely and was able to excuse itself from liability for its negligence and that of its 
servants.
535
 The nautical fault defence was subsequently born out of the carrier’s freedom of 




The nautical fault exception was first successfully captured in legislation under the US Harter 
Act.
537
 It sought a compromise between shipper and carrier interests which provided that the 
carrier shall not be entitled to contract out of its obligation to exercise due diligence to make 
the vessel seaworthy, but would be entitled to rely on certain exemptions, including errors 
caused by its servants in the navigation and management of the ship.
538
 This compromise was 
carried through into international Conventions in the form of the Hague and Hague-Visby 
Rules and accordingly, the nautical fault defence remains available to the carrier provided it 
has shown that it has complied with its Article III (1) obligation. 
5.2.1.2 The concept of the nautical fault defence 
By way of introduction to understanding what the nautical fault defence is, the following 
example by Jansson
539
 may be useful: 
“When a vessel is involved in an accident like grounding or collision there is often some sort 
of damage to the ship or even the total loss of the ship. Let us say the ship is damaged and 
there is seawater leakage or similar, then it is likely that the cargo will also be damaged. In 
most cases where the cargo is lost or damaged the claimant will generally present the 
plausible argument that the carrier would have been able to reduce the damage by having 
made a different navigational decision. In most courts...this would be to dig your own grave. 
The reason for this is that a navigational error performed by almost anyone on board, except 
by the carrier himself, would free the carrier from liability according to law. Furthermore a 
fault in the management of the ship that by mistake damages the cargo can also lead to the 
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freedom of liability for the carrier. These two grounds, available for the carrier’s defence 
against liability for cargo, are together called the nautical fault.”
540
 
Having introduced the concept of the nautical fault defence, the following paragraphs will 
briefly analyse the elements of the nautical fault defence. 
‘Act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot or the servants of the carrier’ 
The first thing to note regarding the defence is that it only operates in respect of an error i.e. a 
fault, and that such error must be in the navigation or management of the ship (as opposed to 
the cargo).
541
 In other words “...it is an erroneous act or omission, the original purpose of 
which was primarily directed towards the ship, her safety and well-being and towards the 
venture generally...”
542
 Furthermore, the carrier is only exonerated from liability in respect of 
faults committed by one of the persons listed in Article IV (2)(a) i.e. the master, mariner, 
pilot or a servant of the carrier.
543
 If it is committed by a person falling outside the list of 
persons under Article IV (2)(a), such as a stevedore (who is an independent contractor and 
does not constitute a servant of the carrier), the carrier will be held liable.
544
 The carrier will 
also not be able to rely on this defence should the damage or loss be attributable to its own 
fault, for example if the crew are improperly trained this could lead to a finding of 
unseaworthiness.
545
 If the master also happens to be the owner or part-owner of the vessel 
and essentially wears ‘two hats’, it is excused from liability for negligence in the navigation 
or management of the ship in respect of its duties committed as master of the vessel, but not 
as owner of the vessel.
546
 And if the damage or loss is committed by a multitude of persons of 
which some fall within the category of persons as mentioned above and some that do not, the 
defence will not apply.
547
 In other words, if there is joint negligence committed by one of the 
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persons falling within the listed category of persons, and one that does not, the carrier is not 
entitled to rely on the exception.
548
  
‘In the Navigation or in the Management of the ship’ 
Neither of the terms ‘navigation’ and ‘management’ have been defined in the Harter Act, the 
Hague or Hague-Visby Rules
549
 and have been subject to considerable litigation.
550
 The term 
‘navigation’ has generally been taken to mean “something having to do with the sailing of the 
ship; that is, of course, the sailing of the ship having regard to the fact that she is cargo-
carrying ship.”
551
 It essentially relates to the sailing of a ship from a known position to its 
destination along a predetermined route.
552
 Examples of fault in the navigation of the vessel 
include the following:  
“faulty berthing, manoeuvring and anchoring, erroneous interpretation and assessment of 
meteorological information, incorrect speed adjustments, abandonment of the vessel, taking 
refuge in a port, non-compliance with local or international navigational rules, forcing a ship 
through a storm, and ascertaining the time to proceed or not to proceed in a risky situation and 
setting a particular course over a bar. The provisions has been held to cover cargo damage 
where, due to the negligence of the master or crew, the vessel struck a reef, hit a quay, ran 
aground or had a collision.”
553
  
The term ‘management’ of the ship concerns the ship’s condition, manning and equipment.
554
 
It is described as a fault in the handling of the ship other than for navigational purposes.
555
 It 
is to be distinguished from care of the cargo, which is a separate obligation of the carrier in 
terms of Article III rule 2.
556
  If an error is made in the care of the cargo or if there is 
mismanagement of the cargo, the carrier will be held liable as per Article III rule 2.
557
 
However, if an error is made in the care of the vessel and such indirectly causes damage or 
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loss to the cargo, the carrier may invoke the exception.
558
 In The Canadian Highlander case, 
a summary is provided of its meaning as follows: 
“…if the cause of the damage is solely, or even primarily, a neglect to take reasonable care of 
the cargo, the ship is liable, but if the cause of the damage is a neglect to take reasonable care 
of the ship, or some part of it, as distinct from the cargo, the ship is relieved from liability, but 
if the negligence is not negligence towards the ship, but only negligent failure to use the 
apparatus of the ship for the protection of the cargo, the ship is not so relieved.”
559
 
Having briefly examined the concept of the nautical fault defence and the position under the 
Hague-Visby Rules, the following paragraphs will examine the position under the Hamburg 
and Rotterdam Rules. 
5.2.2 The position under the Hamburg Rules and the Rotterdam Rules  
During the negotiations surrounding the Hamburg Rules, there was much debate and 
controversy over the nautical fault defence. Ultimately, a decision was taken to abolish the 
nautical fault defence due to the unsuitability of the defence in the modern shipping 
environment.
560
 During the negotiations on the Rotterdam Rules, the Working Group also 
found in favour of its removal and, accordingly, does not feature in the list of exceptions 
under Article 17(3) or at all in the text of the Rules.
561
 Therefore, despite the success of the 
Hague-Visby Rules and the fact that the defence is a long-standing exception to liability, the 
Hamburg Rules and Rotterdam Rules took heed and responded to the calls for its removal in 
a modern shipping environment. 
5.3 To what extent is the absence of the nautical fault defence in the Hamburg Rules 
and the Rotterdam Rules an appropriate solution to the shortcomings of the Hague-
Visby Rules? 
As we have seen, the Hamburg Rules and Rotterdam Rules have taken the bold step of 
removing the nautical fault defence available to carriers under the Hague-Visby Rules. A 
decision as controversial as this will always attract varying opinions, with those in favour of 
the defence, and those who oppose it. Accordingly, the following paragraphs will highlight 
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some of the major arguments put forward by those who oppose the defence, and those in 
favour of the defence. Having examined the major arguments for and against the removal of 
the defence, it will then determine the extent to which the absence of the defence in the 
Hamburg and Rotterdam Rules is an appropriate solution to the Hague-Visby Rules. 
 5.3.1 Arguments opposing the nautical fault defence 
Opponents of the defence, usually cargo interests, argue that it is unfair that carriers be 
exonerated from liability for the negligence of their employees whilst shippers and cargo 
owners have little to no control over the care and protection of their cargo.
562
 They bear a 
great financial risk when placing their goods in the hands of the carrier
563
 and accordingly, it 
is argued that since the carrier is in a better position to exercise care and control over the 
cargo and vessel, it should ultimately bear the risk for the cargo should the acts/negligence of 
its employees result in the loss of or damage to the cargo.
564
 Furthermore, since the defence 
exonerates the carrier from liability due to the negligence of its employees, it in actual fact 
encourages the carrier to prove the negligence of its employees and has the effect of 
protecting the worst performers.
565
  
The defence is also uniquely maritime and does not feature as a defence in any other 
international land or air transport convention.
566
 As a result, it is argued that there is no 
reason why the carrier should be afforded such a protection when same is not available to 
carriers of other modes of transport.
567
 Accordingly, its removal would have the benefit of 
aligning the rules governing sea carriage with other modern transport conventions.
568
 This is 
certainly a positive step toward uniformity and predictability.  
Furthermore, the defence also contradicts the concept of vicarious liability and other modern 
legal principles that hold an employer liable for the negligence of its employees committed 
within the course and scope of their employment.
569
 Its removal would accordingly have the 
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benefit of conforming to modern legal principles of many countries that hold an employer 
liable for the negligence of its employees.  
One of the main arguments put forward by the opponents of the defence is that it is no longer 
suitable in modern times due to technological developments in the shipping industry.
570
 
These developments have provided safer ships (such as steel-built ships), new state-of-the-art 
navigation equipment and more precise weather forecasts.
571
 Ships are therefore more 
durable, able to navigate more easily and avoid harsh weather conditions as much as 
possible.
572
 These advancements in technology and telecommunications also allow ship-
owners and personnel ashore to remain in constant verbal and visual contact with the ship and 
master.
573
 Any defects to the vessel may also be expediently repaired at the nearest port.
574
 
These advancements, coupled with the better employee education and training, means that the 
carrier is now able to exercise greater control over the vessel and the cargo, and ultimately 
this will reduce the risk of navigation and management incidences.
575
 Accordingly, the 
historical rationale for the defence no longer exists and it is unfathomable why a carrier 




Furthermore, although proponents of the defence may convincingly argue that its removal 
may unduly burden the carrier, these arguments do not account for the fact that carriers are 
able to limit their liability in terms of Articles 59-60 of the Rotterdam Rules or the 
Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976.
577
 
Furthermore, the meaning of the defence is not always clear as there is a fine line between 
what is meant by “care of cargo” and “management of ship”, the carrier being responsible for 
the former and not for the latter.
578
 Should the defence be removed, it will at the very least 
remove any ambiguity in this regard, thereby improving certainty and uniformity.
579
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Rather than focusing on why the defence should not be removed, Sooksrisaiparnskit argues 
that carriers should rather focus their efforts on avoiding or reducing the possibility of 
incidences of negligent navigation by implementing and enforcing better safety and security 
measures.
580
 Accordingly, parties should be prepared to embrace a new system of liability.
581
 
5.3.2 Arguments in favour of the nautical fault defence 
One of the major arguments put forward by proponents of the defence is that it has served as 
an important compromise between cargo interests and the carrier for over a century with each 
party bearing certain risks.
582
 It has formed an integral part of the laws on the carriage of 
goods by sea and simply cannot be done away without careful consideration of the 
implications it may have on the balance between carrier and cargo interests.
583
 Given the 
risky nature of sea carriage, an apportionment of risk is necessary to avoid the carrier bearing 
too great a burden.
584
 As we have seen, the absence of the defence under the Hamburg Rules 
and the perceived increase in carrier liability ultimately resulted in the Rules failing to 
achieve widespread acceptance.
585
 It may be a sign that carrier interests are not yet ready to 
forgo the nautical fault defence and the protection it affords. Its absence in the Rotterdam 
Rules could result in it sharing a similar fate to the Hamburg Rules, thereby further 
frustrating uniformity and predictability on the rules governing the carriage of goods by sea.  
Although not as risky a venture as once deemed, and despite modern technologies, sea 
carriage still remains inherently perilous and carriers are exposed to great dangers unique to 
sea carriage.
586
 Accordingly, the defence serves the purpose of protecting carriers in instances 
of “grave occurrences”, and should the defence be removed, it could potentially hold the 
carrier to such a high level of liability that it could end up in a state of bankruptcy.
587
 Given 
the dangers of sea carriage and the value of the cargo carried, any slight act or neglect could 
result in a great loss for the carrier, including losing the whole of its maritime asset should 
there be a collision, grounding or sinking.
588
 Furthermore, its abolition could lead to 
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increased freight rates and insurance costs due to the increase in liability of the carrier.
589
 
Although, it must be noted, it cannot be said for certain what impact it will actually have on 
freight and insurance costs and litigation, due to a lack of evidence in this regard.
590
 Most are 
of the opinion, however, that the economic impact on the parties involved will not be as great 
as may first seem.
591
 
Proponents of the defence further argue that its removal would not necessarily encourage 
carriers to exercise greater care over the cargo. The carrier is already inclined to exercise 
great care over its client’s cargo as its reputation and the profitability of the company is at 
stake.
592
 Thus, there is already an economic incentive to exercise care over the client’s cargo 
and accordingly its removal would have no impact on the carrier’s current conduct.  
Furthermore, it would not encourage masters and crew to act more prudently if the defence 
were removed as they are already conscious of their actions given the fact that their negligent 
conduct could affect their records and could lead to criminal sanctions.
593
  
5.3.3 Overall assessment 
The arguments put forward by the opponents of the defence are convincing and legitimate. It 
is fair to say that the nautical fault defence is an archaic exception to liability, justified largely 
by reasons no longer applicable in a modern shipping context. Given the advancements in 
technology and communications, and the fact that it does not accord with modern legal 
principles or feature as a defence in any other transport convention, the retention of the 
defence in the modern shipping environment is questionable. Its removal from the Hamburg 
Rules as early as 1978 when the Rules were adopted clearly reflects a strong call for its 
removal by the international maritime community. Its absence once again from the text of the 
Rotterdam Rules is a clear sign that the defence should no longer form part of sea carriage 
laws. Its removal would surely be a positive step toward a more modern sea carriage 
environment and may place cargo interests in a better bargaining position. For these reasons, 
from the perspective of what is fair and just, it seems that the absence of the defence in a 
modern shipping environment is an appropriate solution to the Hague-Visby Rules, in theory. 
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Despite what has been said above that the absence of the nautical fault defence is an 
appropriate solution in theory, it is debatable whether its removal is an appropriate solution 
from a practical perspective. The allocation of risk is cause for concern in this regard. By 
adopting the Rotterdam Rules, the carrier will be losing one of the most important and long-
standing defences available to it, one which it may not be willing to forgo so easily, 
regardless of whether or not its removal would actually have a significant financial impact or 
not. And since the seaworthiness obligation has also been extended, this perceived increase in 
carrier liability may affect a State’s decision whether to adopt the Rules or not. It is 
questionable whether it was worth removing the defence when the success of the Rotterdam 
Rules is at stake and given the potential upheaval it may cause.
594
 If the Rules have not 
succeeded in achieving a compromise between the relevant interests, and does not ultimately 
achieve uniformity, it cannot be said that its removal is an appropriate solution.
595
 Should the 
Rules not achieve widespread success due to the perceived imbalance between carrier and 
shipper interests, we will have yet another maritime Convention in force, further frustrating 
uniformity and predictability. The absence of the defence in the Hamburg Rules and the 
perceived increase in carrier liability ultimately resulted in the Rules failing to achieve 
widespread acceptance. Accordingly, its removal was not an appropriate solution and may be 
an indication that the removal of the defence from the Rotterdam Rules is not an appropriate 
solution. In this regard, practically speaking, the appropriateness of the absence of the 
defence from the Rotterdam Rules is debatable.  
Furthermore, it cannot be said for certain whether countries would be able to comply in 
practice should the defence be removed. Although one of the main arguments put forward by 
the opponents of the defence is that technological advancements have made the defence 
futile, it cannot be said that all States are so well equipped in terms of technology and 
telecommunications, and advanced in terms of their maritime training and education that they 
can afford to operate without the defence.
596
 To what extent parties to a contract of carriage 
would be able to comply in practice is beyond the scope of this study. It is merely the 
author’s submission that broad sweeping statements that technological advancements in the 
shipping industry have made the defence futile may not reflect a true reality. It does not 
necessarily mean that all States are so well advanced in terms of technologies and 
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telecommunications and that its removal would be appropriate for each State. It will 
ultimately be up to each individual State to determine such. 
5.4 Conclusion 
There are many arguments both for and against the defence, each valid and convincing. On 
the one hand, the absence of the defence would be a positive step toward achieving a modern 
liability regime, reflecting the advancements in the shipping industry and modern legal 
principles.  Perhaps the old adage ‘there is no time like the present’ is apt and carriers should 
prepare for this new shift in liability given its removal at some point is inevitable. Based on 
the above, in theory, the removal of the nautical fault defence is a logical and an appropriate 
response to the Hague-Visby Rules. On the other hand, however, one cannot ignore the fact 
that there is a real possibility carriers/ship-owners may not be ready for this change, despite 
the fact that its removal has been a long time coming. The Hamburg Rules adopted an 
entirely different system of liability in the form of Article 5, and perhaps this new system did 
not sit well with carriers and ship-owners, given the success of the Hague/Hague-Visby 
Rules. Thus, there may still be hope for the Rotterdam Rules, given its similarities with the 
Hague-Visby Rules in terms of wording and construction. However, the removal of the 
defence from the Rotterdam Rules is cause for concern, and perhaps, the world is not yet 
ready for this change. Only time will tell. For now, practically speaking, it is the author’s 
submission that the appropriateness of the removal of the nautical fault defence from the 











CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
6.1 Introduction 
Today’s international carriage of goods by sea is largely regulated by various international 
conventions, including the Hague Rules, the Hague-Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules, as 
well as national or ‘hybrid’ regimes that incorporate elements of the various international 
conventions.
597
 Such a multiplicity of regimes governing the international carriage of goods 
by sea impacts on uniformity and creates legal uncertainty. Coupled with the fact that these 
regimes have significant shortcomings, it is clear that there is a need for a modern and 
uniform set of rules to govern the carriage of goods by sea. In this regard, the CMI and 
UNCITRAL took heed, resulting in the adoption of the Rotterdam Rules on 11 December 
2008.  The Rotterdam Rules is an international sea Convention aimed at providing a uniform 
and modern set of principles to govern the international carriage of goods by sea.
598
 They 
have introduced significant changes in the hopes of addressing the shortcomings of the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules. Three of the major changes introduced 
by the Rules, and which formed the basis of this study, are the provision for multimodal 
transportation, the extension of the carrier’s seaworthiness obligation, and the removal of the 
nautical fault defence. The aim of this study, therefore, was to engage in a comparative 
analysis between the Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules and the Rotterdam Rules with 
regard to multimodal transportation, the carrier’s seaworthiness obligation and the nautical 
fault defence to determine the extent to which the Rotterdam Rules have provided appropriate 
solutions to the shortcomings of its predecessors. In this regard, the following paragraphs will 
provide a summary of the findings.  
6.2 Summary of the findings 
In chapter three, the concept of multimodal transportation was examined. Arguably one of the 
most innovative and significant changes introduced by the Rotterdam Rules is the provision 
for multimodal transportation. In today’s modern trading environment, goods are increasingly 
being carried by multiple modes of transport through the use of containers.
599
  Through the 
extension of the scope of application and period of responsibility of the carrier, the Rules 
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allow for the application of one Convention to the entire contract of carriage that envisages 
sea carriage and carriage by other modes of transport. However, through an analysis of the 
multimodal aspects of the Rules it was established that they are not without their concerns, 
especially with regard to Articles 26 and 82 with arguments that they are overly complex. 
Furthermore, the Rules were never originally conceived as a truly multimodal regime, and the 
decision to extend the scope of application was somewhat of an afterthought, and perhaps this 
is reflected in the final text.
600
 Despite these concerns, modern trade practices require an 
international Convention that regulates multimodal carriage, and it is clear that the Hague-
Visby Rules and Hamburg Rules are completely lacking in this regard. The multimodal 
aspects are not the pinnacle of perfection, nor are the Rules the multimodal regime many had 
been waiting for, but perhaps for now, in order to meet the needs of modern trade, they are 
the next best solution. This is not to say that the Rules in their entirety are an appropriate and 
effective solution to the shortcomings its predecessors. However, for our purposes, the 
multimodal aspects of the Rules may be regarded as an appropriate solution to its 
predecessors.  
Chapter four of this study examined the carrier’s seaworthiness obligation. Under the Hague-
Visby Rules, the carrier is only required to exercise due diligence before and at the beginning 
of the voyage to make the vessel seaworthy. Under the Hamburg Rules, the drafters opted for 
a presumed fault based liability system, meaning that the carrier is presumed at fault for loss, 
damage or delay unless it can show that he or his servants took all measures reasonably 
possible to avoid such loss, damage or delay. Accordingly, the familiar wording of the 
seaworthiness obligation under the Hague-Visby Rules does not feature in the text of the 
Hamburg Rules. Under the Rotterdam Rules, the drafters retained the seaworthiness 
obligation, however, the obligation has been extended and the carrier is required to exercise 
due diligence to make and keep the vessel seaworthy throughout the entire voyage by sea. 
Given the shortcomings of the Hague-Visby Rules and Hamburg Rules, at first glance the 
extension under the Rotterdam Rules may seem like an appropriate solution, however, its 
provisions relating to the seaworthiness obligation are concerning. The main issue with the 
Rules lies in the basis of the carrier’s liability and burden of proof, which has effectively 
removed the overriding nature of the seaworthiness obligation. It is submitted that Article 17 
is overly complex and places too great a burden on the shipper/cargo-interest to show the 
unseaworthiness of the vessel. Furthermore, although the extension may reflect advancements 
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in the shipping industry and stringent safety measures in force (the ISM code), it is doubtful 
whether it is really worth adopting a complex Convention with 96 Articles if it merely re-
iterates what is already in practice and what carriers are already required to comply with. The 
Rules are not revolutionary, they fail to achieve an appropriate allocation of risk as between 
carrier and shipper, and are overly complex and too detailed.  As a result, it submitted that the 
extension of the seaworthiness obligation under the Rotterdam Rules is not an appropriate 
solution to the shortcomings of the Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules.  Perhaps an 
amendment to the Hague-Visby Rules that reflect the advancements in the shipping industry 
would be a more appropriate solution. 
The fifth chapter provided an examination of the contentious nautical fault defence which 
exonerates the carrier from liability for the errors of its master and staff in the navigation or 
management of the vessel. The defence was first successfully introduced into legislation in 
the US Harter Act and has survived over a hundred years with its most recent version found 
in the Hague-Visby Rules. The defence was historically justified on the grounds that the 
carrier exercised very little control over the vessel and cargo once at sea. Such control was so 
much in the hands of the master and crew that it was reasonable to excuse the carrier from 
liability for their errors in the management and navigation of the vessel. However, due to 
technological advancements in the shipping industry, the historical rationale for the defence 
arguably no longer exists. Due to these advancements in technology, and other arguments put 
forward by opponents of the defence, there has been a strong call for its removal in recent 
years. In this regard, the Hamburg and Rotterdam Rules have responded and the defence has 
been excluded from the text of the Rules. In theory, from the perspective of what is fair and 
just, the removal of the nautical fault defence in today’s modern shipping environment is an 
appropriate solution. However, from a practical perspective, the answer is not entirely 
straightforward. The balancing effect created by the nautical fault defence cannot be 
overstated. It is a well-entrenched defence under sea carriage laws and has served as an 
important compromise between carrier and shipper for years. To simply do away with the 
nautical fault defence may see the Rotterdam Rules share the same fate as the Hamburg Rules 
due to fears that the Rules may unduly burden the carrier. Accordingly, concerns regarding 
the fairness of the defence are not enough in determining whether its removal is an 
appropriate solution. Furthermore, it cannot be said for certain that all parties to the 
Convention involved in a carriage of goods contract would be able to cope without the 
defence, despite the advancements in technology. Therefore, from a practical perspective, the 
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appropriateness of the absence of the nautical fault defence under the Rotterdam Rules as a 
solution to the alleged shortcomings of the Hague-Visby Rules is debatable and only time 
will tell whether ship-owning nations are ready to forgo the protection of the nautical fault 
defence. 
6.3 Conclusion  
The introductory chapter of this study revealed that there is a need for a modern and uniform 
transport Convention that will cater for the needs of the shipping industry and that will also 
balance the allocation of risk as between carrier and shipper. The historical overview of this 
study has shown that the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, although widely accepted and highly 
successful, are considered outdated in modern times and it is argued that the Rules tend to 
favour carrier interests. Conversely, the Hamburg Rules have failed to achieve widespread 
acceptance, and tend to favour cargo interests. In this regard, the Rotterdam Rules are 
intended to serve as a modern set of rules that will replace the current sea conventions in 
force for the purpose of achieving uniformity and predictability in the rules governing the 
international carriage of goods by sea. The Rules represent a serious attempt to meet the 
needs of the shipping industry and that caters for the various parties involved.
601
 The Rules 
have attempted to achieve their goal of providing a modern set of rules to some extent by 
providing for multimodal transportation, extending the carrier’s seaworthiness obligation and 
by removing the contentious nautical fault defence. However, an analysis into these three 
major changes has revealed that they are not without their concerns. They are potentially 
over-complicated and do not appropriately allocate risks as between carrier and shipper. The 
Rules had the potential to be a modern and uniform Convention that balanced the obligations 
and risks of the carrier and shipper. However, having analysed these three major changes it 
cannot be said they have achieved this. Accordingly, it is debatable whether the Rotterdam 
Rules have provided appropriate solutions to the shortcomings of the Hague-Visby Rules and 
Hamburg Rules. This is not to say the Rules in their entirety fail to achieve their goals and 
respond appropriately to the shortcomings of the Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules as a 
whole. Such is beyond the scope of this study and it cannot be said whether the Rules ought 
to replace the current sea Conventions in force. However, with 96 Articles, there are concerns 
that the Rules are potentially overly complex. Furthermore, given the fact that they have been 
open for signature since 2009 and have only received three ratifications, it may be a reflection 
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of the current attitudes towards the Rules. If the Rules do not achieve the requisite number of 
ratifications to enter into force, all the years of effort of UNCITRAL and CMI would have 
been in vain.
602
 If, however, they do receive the requisite number of ratifications to enter into 
force but do not achieve widespread success, this will lead to a further fragmentation of the 
rules governing the carriage of goods by sea, thereby further frustrating uniformity and 
predictability.
603
 Perhaps an amendment to the Hague-Visby Rules, a widely accepted 
Convention, is the best solution for the time being (as they do not cater for multimodal 
transportation) in order that the technological advancements and stringent safety standards 
are reflected and that burden of proof under the Hague-Visby Rules is retained. This will 
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